

JUTTA AUMÜLLER

## **Migration and Development Aid Policy\***

### **Practical Models of Implementation**

The current debate on how to combine migration policy with development aid has its origin in the early 1990s. After the collapse of the communist regimes in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe and the subsequent opening of the Iron Curtain, huge numbers were expected to migrate into western European countries. At that time, the issue at hand was how the necessary reconstruction aid could be coupled with a restriction of the prospected waves of migrants. International agencies such as the ILO, the UN-HCR, the OECD and the IOM put the issue on their agendas. In the last decade, several large conferences took place in which different aspects of a migration-related development aid policy were discussed in a general manner. These discussions were not limited, though, to the countries of the former communist block, but originated from the experience of the extensive movements of migrants and refugees all over the world during the 1980s. This article's task is to examine what influence these discussions had on the practice of development aid agencies during the last decade.

The following article presents the results of a survey of institutions working on development aid policy. The survey

---

\* translated by William Hiscott

Combining Migration Policy and Development Aid Policy was carried out by the Berlin Institute for Comparative Social Research in 2001. In this article, current scholarly concepts of a migration-oriented development aid policy will be depicted. Also, it will be determined how – and to what extent – these concepts have already been implemented. The article will begin with an overview of the theoretical discussions in the 1990s and will then, in its main section, turn to the results of our survey. It will become clear that, in practice, the models which contain migration-oriented development aid and which are espoused by most European immigration countries, concentrate on migrant repatriation coupled with development aid incentives. The broad variety of theoretical models up to now has not in any way been exhausted in the practice up to date. Only in a few countries can it be seen that attempts have been made to move away from state-regulated migration control towards policies in which migrants themselves, as subjects in development policy, are moved into the centre of decision-making processes.

### **The debate on development aid policy and migration in the 1990s**

In the last fifty years, the leading paradigms concerning international development aid policies have gone through repeated change. Before 1989, the criteria for the allocation of development aid had been determined for decades through block affiliation. Since then, an extensive restructuring of international development aid has occurred. Both the targeting of the factors that cause migration and the prevention of crises have become the key phrases in the international debate in regards to this restructuring. More

and more, development aid has been directly applied to the elimination of those social crises preventing development. Accordingly, the prevention of refugee movements increasingly became the object of development policy programmes in the 1990s.

Because of weak economic growth alternating with phases of economic recession, it has also become increasingly difficult for politicians in industrial states to justify development aid to their constituents; development aid has often been publicly justified through the argument that it could help to avoid international conflict situations. Although the call for international solidarity was frequently underlined with subliminal or explicit threats of mass invasions of unemployed immigrants from the Third World,<sup>1</sup> development aid strategies that aim to prevent emigration have rarely been implemented by the industrial states in the 1990s.<sup>2</sup>

With regards to its implementation of development aid, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) provides one example. The BMZ repeatedly commented on topics concerning migration and refugees in the 1990s. In a recent brochure, the BMZ determines that development aid policy should fulfil the important tasks of avoiding larger refugee movements and of making the voluntary return of refugees possible (BMZ: 2000, 233). The ministry supports these statements through the concept "Refugee Policy in the Context of Development Work", a concept which was formulated in 1994 as a component of the comprehensive plan "Development of Peace and Crisis Prevention". The main focal points for a migration and development aid policy found in this plan are:

- the elimination of the reasons that cause flight and migration;
- support for the host countries in coping with refugee crises and the elimination of their negative consequences;
- support for return refugees and aid for reintegration in the native country (ibid., 233–234).

Although it is stated in this ministerial publication that in the future “the questions of the rapidly progressing urbanisation and migration movements ... will become more important” (282–283), the actual policy of the ministry has not formed a separate framework of concrete measures pertaining to these questions. Rather, as a contribution towards keeping uncontrolled urbanisation and migration in check, the BMZ concentrates its efforts on population policy measures which aim at reducing natural population growth in the developing countries.<sup>3</sup>

Although proposals for a practical, migration-oriented development aid policy resurfaced again and again in debates in the 1990s, it is still a fringe issue in the industrial countries. Different reasons for this can be named:

- The knowledge base concerning how movements of migration can be affected by development aid is small. Systematic research hereunto first began in the 1990s, and has not yet found broad support under academics. A sound knowledge base can only be attained through a systematic evaluation of the single measures which have previously taken place. As of yet, a comprehensive scholarly evaluation of such projects has not been undertaken.<sup>4</sup>
- In the 1990s, migration-oriented development aid policies were discussed within the large international migration agencies, including the ILO, the UNHCR, as

well as the OECD. Since then these agencies have held consultations at regular intervals concerning the possibilities of a control of migration processes through development aid. The results of these consultations have been rudimentary for the practical work carried out by development aid organisations, which are in the majority of cases either small or large NGOs.

- Especially from the viewpoint of private development aid organisations, this topic remains intertwined with the defensive attempts made by the western immigration countries to prevent unwanted immigration. The NGOs, to be specific, fear greatly that they will be utilised for the implementation of governmental policies restricting migration; accordingly, the resistance against becoming involved in such discussions is intense.

The development potential of transnational migrant communities was specifically discussed at global forums where the relationship between migration and development was discussed, such as the United Nations International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo (1994) and the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen (1995). With this, an important side issue entered into the international debate: at the outset of the 1990s, the issue surrounding the prevention of mass emigration of poverty-stricken eastern Europeans, a scenario which had been forecasted after the fall of the Iron Curtain, was still the main focus in the international debate; but with these conferences, migrant communities in diaspora and their potential for development-related initiatives in their countries of origin became part of the discussion. However, this international discussion was only minimal at regional and national levels. Only a few governments, for example France and the Netherlands, started to support

immigration communities in the planning and execution of development-relevant projects in immigrants' countries of origin. According to Niessen and Mochel (1999, 15–18), the resistance to such support can be explained through the fact that migration-related issues are generally seen through the one-sided viewpoint of the prevention of migration: the aim to keep potential migrants in their countries of origin simply resonates better in terms of public relations than the aim to find development-related potential in migration itself. Moreover, state agencies and non-governmental organisations involved in development aid policy stay away from this issue because the financial resources for development aid policy are becoming more and more scarce. While the spectrum of priorities and new responsibilities constantly becomes wider.

### **Theoretical debates:**

#### **Does development actually reduce migration?**

Since the end of the 1980s, it has been stated more and more often that development aid policy is the best migration policy. All apparent plausibility notwithstanding, in reality this blanket statement is simply not correct. Hermele (1997, 147) points out that a number of countries with completely different levels of development have the same emigration rates. Examples are: South Korea and Indonesia, as well as Tunisia and Yemen. An increase in economic growth obviously does not suffice to reduce emigration. Obviously, different and overlapping factors must be present in order to slow the emigration processes. According to Hermele, these include: a just distribution of national income, a liberal political climate, a low unemployment rate and a fairly balanced economic structure (*ibid.*).

Uncertainty rules as well in economic theory and political science over how development and migration are connected to one another. The debates in regards to how emigration can be reduced with the help of development aid policy are founded on the following political and economic instruments:

- the promotion of free trade;
- increased foreign direct investment;
- a specific foreign development aid which is applied directly to the areas of origin of emigrants;
- the support of human rights, democracy and good governance in the countries of origin of migrants;
- a strengthening of the economic position of migrants and ethnic minorities in the diaspora.

The theoretical connection between migration and development can be reconstructed in various ways. Different theories based in the fields of development and migration can be looked at in order to determine how they can be applied to migration-oriented development research. When one wishes to examine which migration-oriented development aid strategies have been implemented in the past, one must analyse different political fields and create a systematic overview of these strategies.<sup>5</sup> The political fields in question include: international economic policy, human rights politics, minority politics, refugee politics and labour market politics.

In the 1990s, various theoretical models were presented addressing the relationship between migration and development. In particular, the OECD took the initiative, and organised several conferences and workshops concerning this topic. Specifically, the different theoretical models found in the book *Development Strategy, Employment and*

Migration - Insights from Models (1996), edited by J. Edward Taylor, should be mentioned here. In these theoretical discussions, the "modified reverse U-curve" (Fischer; Martin; Straubhaar: 1997), or rather, the "migration hump" (Martin; Taylor: 1996), prevailed over the schematic neo-classicist notion of the adjustment of factor costs through unhampered mobility of capital and labour. The prevailing terms both stand for a model, in which the adopted linearity between development and the rate of decline of migration is modified. An outline of the model, as developed in an article from Fischer, Martin and Straubhaar in 1997, will be discussed here. In this extensive article, the authors attempt to analyse the causal connection between development and migration. The questions that they raise in their examination are: does migration actually depend on a certain economic development standard? Or, does an increase of income per capita contribute to the reduction of emigration? The authors suggest that a dynamic theory of migration and development must take into account the interplay between the following two factors, namely the influence of (initial) development on migration and the effects of migration on development. In order to answer these questions, they develop the "modified reversed U-curve" model and, in doing so, formulate the following hypotheses:

- In lesser developed countries, there exists only a small degree of (internal) migration. This is contingent on the availability of necessary resources and, as the case may be, on social conflicts.
- Internal migration occurs more often at higher levels of development. Here, a qualified professional elite forms the potential for an emigration away from the country of origin.



- Due to the development of international migration systems, migration becomes a more and more concrete option for broad layers of the population.
- The incentives for emigration diminish in accordance with the economic development level of the country at hand. A decline in migration due to economic development in the country of origin emerges, therefore, with a certain temporal delay. (Fischer; Martin; Straubhaar: 1997, 129).

Other controversies in the scholarly discussion are: in which way development aid policy measures might have to be used in order to steer migration, and how far these measures are contravened by the strong structural hindrances still found in global economic relations. The implementation of worldwide trade liberalisation can serve here as an example: The UNDP assessed in a report in 1994 that primarily the OECD countries would profit from the dismantling of trade barriers. In this report, it was estimated that these countries would book two-thirds of all trade increases until the year 2002 (Hermele: 1997, 147-148). For example, the liberalisation of trade between the EU and the Maghreb states, implemented through an association treaty in the 1990s, resulted in a situation in which the Maghreb states had to dismantle their restrictions on the import of industry products from the EU, although the EU did not have to loosen its import restrictions on agricultural products from the Maghreb states (Collinson; Edye: 1996, 81). Also, with regard to foreign direct investments, it is important to note that these are disproportionately distributed: Between 1989-1992, almost three quarters of all foreign direct investment to countries of the south went to a mere ten countries. In Bangladesh and Algeria, for example, foreign direct investment would have to be increased hundredfold

in order to approach the sum of the remittances transferred by foreign workers into these countries. In the past, the International Monetary Fund's strict structural adjustment policy has even led to a strong devaluation of the local currencies in many countries. This has, in turn, brought about an enormous increase in the value of migrants' incomes transferred to the countries of origin.

Public foreign aid measures can cause counter-productive effects regarding migration as well. Within the last few decades, foreign aid for modernisation has contributed to the uprooting of potential migrants and to forced migration. The controversial dams in India serve here as good examples. Or, with regard to the association treaty mentioned above between the EU and the Maghreb states, the costs caused by the trade liberalisation were in part compensated for by an increase of EU aid to the countries in the Mediterranean region. This aid amounted to 4.7 billion ECU between 1995 and 1999. The governments of these countries, however, have made it clear that they would prefer the loosening of import restrictions on agricultural products on the side of the EU to every form of direct EU development aid (Collinson; Edye: 1996, 83).

If the pressure to migrate is to be reduced in emigration countries, additional occupation and income possibilities must be created. Besides the development of the service sector, the mobilisation of the manufacturing sector is regarded here as the most important strategy. Of special interest here is the focus on small and medium-sized businesses as a migration-reducing strategy, not only because the cost of creating new jobs in such businesses is significantly lower than in large-scale industry, but also because these businesses can be more frequently established in rural regions than the latter. These small and medium-sized businesses can also reduce urban migration (Schiller: 1994,

221). They can be supported through credit aid for their establishment, as well as through special educational and professional qualifying programmes. Later in this article, programmes will be discussed that encourage the return of migrants to their country of origin through support given for the purpose of establishing such businesses.

### **Empirical Research: The surveys conducted by the Berlin Institute for Comparative Social Research (1992/1993 and 2001)**

The brief portrayal of the theoretical debates above clearly shows that no consensus has been achieved in the scholarly and political debates on determining whether instruments of development aid policy can reduce migration, and, if so, which of these instruments should be utilised. To find out what practical relevance this topic has taken on in the course of the political changes since 1989, two empirical studies were carried out in the last decade by the Berlin Institute for Comparative Social Research with regard to the topic of development aid policy and migration. The intention here was to survey migration-oriented development aid policy measures and projects that were actually being implemented. By means of a questionnaire, public and private institutions involved with development aid were surveyed, as well as experts from the different OECD member states. The first pilot study was conducted in 1992/1993 and consisted of interviews of around 200 institutions relevant to development aid policy, NGOs and experts. According to the self-assessments of the questioned institutions, the relevance given to migration played a very minor role in the institutions' pursued projects, although the levels of

awareness concerning this problem varied strongly among the individual countries (see Blaschke: 1993).

We repeated this survey in 2001. A questionnaire, which only differed slightly from the one used in 1992/1993, was sent to approximately 400 agencies relevant to development aid policy and specialists in the OECD states. Complementary telephony interviews were also carried out. In the questionnaire, questions were asked about the following fields of work, regarding single projects:

- development policy projects that are conducted with a focus on controlling migration processes;
- projects of repatriation and the long-term resettlement of migrants and refugees;
- the use of migrant workers' remittances for supporting structural measures in the regions of origin;
- environmental programmes aiming at the reduction of flight and refuge;
- educational programmes specifically designed for migrants and refugees and which are relevant for development;
- liberalisation of trade with the explicit purpose of reducing migration pressure.

As in the case of our survey at the beginning 1990s, feedback from the questionnaires was low. Directly addressed written or telephone inquiries proved to be more effective. For these reasons, it is not possible to claim that the available quantitative material can be seen as representative. The available material, however, allows for interesting observations; these will be presented in the following parts of this article. Generally, we can point to the following interesting aspects of our study:

Firstly, the sponsors of development measures frequently possess no understanding of the relevance of some development projects in regards to migration. Vice-versa, the sponsors also barely reflect on the relevancy of migration in regards to development projects. For example, a (private) German sponsor who performs development work for Volga Germans in Russia answered in negative to the question, whether the sponsor provides development aid relevant to migration.

Secondly, it was observed that private institutions reacted in a reserved manner to our study. Some of the NGOs questioned expressed strong reservations against our survey, and opposed every inclination towards the control of migration through development aid. The reaction against the idea that their own work could be utilised in the name of a restrictive migration policy was quite clear.

Thirdly, migration-oriented development aid policy potentially contains a wide spectrum of measures, which we will later discuss in detail. In practice, though, a particular kind of repatriation policy dominates in regards to migrants and refugees, in which repatriation is combined with reintegration aid thought to be relevant to development aid policy.

The results of our interviews can be presented by looking at the three main dominant emphases of migration-oriented development aid policy: these are, first, development aid and cultural support programmes for diaspora minorities in foreign countries; secondly, programmes supporting the repatriation of migrants combined with specific development aid policy measures; and, thirdly, a repatriation policy regarding refugees which places an emphasis on reconstruction measures in the countries of origin. The results of the surveys will be complemented here with information from academic literature. Our survey

produced no practical results with regard to the areas of trade liberalisation and the use of foreign direct investments. Therefore, the available literature was examined in regard to practical measures and strategies.

### *Development programmes for diaspora minorities*

At the beginning of the 1990s, and especially due to the opening of the Iron Curtain, the discussion about development aid policy and its relevance to migration was given a fresh impetus. At that time, it was expected that the newly won freedom to travel would motivate a large number of citizens of central and eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union to migrate to western European countries due to the substantially higher standards of living in the latter countries. There were also discussions at the outset of the 1990s about which development aid incentives must be implemented in order to create economic alternatives to emigration for the population of potential emigration countries.

This discussion found a special resonance in Germany. In and around 1990, approximately two million people of German descent lived in the former republics of the Soviet Union. There were also about 1.3 million ethnic Germans living in central and eastern European countries, of which approximately one million were to be found in Poland.<sup>6</sup> After World War II, these diaspora Germans suffered from persecution and expropriation; they were underprivileged as well. German politics took this circumstance into account while formulating and implementing the Federal Exile Law (*Bundesvertriebenengesetz*). According to this law, diaspora Germans from eastern Europe and the USSR were allowed enter the Federal Republic of Germany, were

given German citizenship after only a short period of time and were rendered comprehensive financial assistance for integration. Due to the closed borders, however, the number of these resettled persons was very limited until the end of the 1980s.

After the fall of the communist regimes in eastern Europe and the USSR, the number of emigrants of German descent increased exponentially. Before 1989, the number of ethnic Germans who migrated to the Federal Republic amounted to hundreds per annum and, at most, 8,500 in 1978. In 1990, the number had increased to almost 150,000; by 1994, the zenith was reached with 213,000 resettled persons (Schwarz: 2001, 40-41). According to information from the German Ministry of the Interior, almost 1.8 million ethnic Germans from the Soviet Union, as well as the countries of the former Soviet Union, resettled in Germany between 1950 and 1998. Departure occurred mainly out of areas where ethnic Germans had been densely settled (Informationsdienst Deutsche in der ehemaligen Sowjetunion, no. 50, October 1999, 11). In the beginning of the 1990s in order to curb the exodus of German emigrants from eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the German federal government conceived both a support programme and a new resettlement law placing restrictions on the number of immigrants per annum. This support programme aimed to encourage ethnic Germans not living in Germany to remain in their places of residency. Firstly, this programme relied on financial aid towards improving both the living conditions of ethnic Germans living in regions where they make up a high percentage of the population, as well as the living conditions for all persons living in these regions. A second component of this policy looked towards strengthening civil rights, the rights of self-determination and the cultural autonomy

of diaspora Germans. Moreover, there was an attempt to provide alternatives to the options of either resettlement or cultural assimilation, primarily through the establishment of community centres and the furtherance of language courses for the ethnic Germans remaining in their places of residency. This aid programme, which at times had an annual budget of over 200 million German marks at its disposal, was implemented under the management of the federal government's *Aussiedlerbeauftragter*, as part of the Federal Ministry of the Interior. The term "development aid policy" does not appear in connection with the support of diaspora Germans. Rather, this support is still regarded as compensation for the burdens suffered through the consequences of the war.

The support of diaspora Germans in the countries of the former Soviet Union consisted primarily of aid for the development of infrastructure. This aid was transferred directly to the individual governments in question, and these governments ultimately decided how the funds were to be used. The emphasis was placed on supporting regions with a high density of ethnic Germans: in the Russian Federation, for example, these were (and still are) the administrative district of Halbstadt in the Altai and Asovo regions in Omsk, the Novosibirsk/Tomsk region in West Siberia, a few locations in the Volga region and, since 1993, the St. Petersburg area (Info-Dienst Deutsche Aussiedler, no. 100, April 1999, 11-12). Similar emphases were placed on regional support programmes in regions with a high ethnic German population in the other countries of the former Soviet Union and in eastern European countries. These programmes should have aided all persons living in the support regions. However, some of the benefits were restricted to ethnic Germans. One example is the development of housing projects explicitly for ethnic



German families, or the allocation of loans and funds for the establishment of businesses through a narrow specification of the possible client group. On the other hand, the municipal communities as a whole profited from improvements in their infrastructure. In addition to the development of housing projects and infrastructure, the so-called breadth work (*Breitenarbeit*) formed a third pillar of these programmes: this consisted of various language and cultural offerings for ethnic Germans in their countries of residency, "which should primarily serve to strengthen the feeling of togetherness, to overcome their historically contingent isolation and their partial uprooting, as well as to raise the acceptance and the social prestige of ethnic Germans in their countries of origin through the conscious opening towards and inclusion of other neighbouring ethnic groups" (Fumetti: 1999, 45).

In the eastern European countries (Poland, Hungary, Romania and the Czech Republic), aid programmes emphasized the promotion of culture (Ronge: 1997, 136). Both this cultural support and the breadth work programme were aimed at promoting the willingness under the ethnic Germans to stay in their countries of residency. For example, a decision was made not to use any language textbooks oriented towards integration in Germany, but rather special learning materials oriented towards topics concerning Russian-Germans. Also, the work in community centres was focused on promoting the willingness of the ethnic Germans to remain in their places of residency. With this in mind, the community centres receiving aid through the breadth work programme were placed under contract which did not allow them to provide infrastructure support, i.e. technical equipment, offices or staff, for emigration services (Fumetti: 1999, 50).

Since the German government changed hands in 1998, the aid for ethnic Germans in Russia has been reduced. The emphasis now lies on 'breadth work'. Before subsidies were reduced, massive irregularities were discovered in the use of the funds. For example, a check of the balance sheets of one of the German mediator organisations entrusted with the realisation of such programmes revealed that several million German marks of support funds had "disappeared" (Schwarz: 2001, 49). Also, no more large economic and infrastructure projects were to be sponsored, because there were doubts about whether these projects could actually promote the willingness for Russian-Germans to stay in their countries of residency.

In regards to support measures for diaspora Germans, the term "development aid" had been avoided from the beginning. The realisation of the project was administered by the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), and the actual project work in the support regions was organised by private mediator organisations such as the Diaconical Organisation of the Protestant Church (Diakonisches Werk) in Germany, the German Caritas Association, the German Red Cross and by German displaced persons' organisations. An embedding of these measures in an elaborate development aid policy strategy did not occur (Schwarz: 2001, 49). Instead, after the government changed hands in 1998, a "new orientation concerning aid in the countries of origin" was decided upon (Info-Dienst Deutsche Aussiedler, no. 103, September 1999, 13ff.). Here, it is stated that, in the future, aid projects are to be reviewed in a more comprehensive manner with regards to their effectiveness, and that experiences made through development aid policies are also to be included in these reviews. In addition, large-scale investment projects are to be excluded from future support programmes, and economic support should

only be provided for on a smaller scale. This means that loans for the establishment of small businesses and trades are to be provided for, as well as agricultural support. In addition, other economic projects should only be indirectly supported through education and training measures and through advice and project accompaniment (Info-Dienst Deutsche Aussiedler, no. 103, September 1999, 19). Aid projects with the goals of improving perspectives for livelihood in Russia, strengthening the cultural autonomy of ethnic Germans and creating a long-term alternative for emigration are presently being pursued.

### *Support programmes for diaspora Fins (Ingrians) in Russia*

In the context of our survey we received information about the Finnish variant of support for diaspora minorities. The Ingrians are an ethnic minority of Finnish origin who con-scribe to the Lutheran religion, and who were incorporated into the Tsarist empire at the beginning of the 18th century after territorial conflicts between Sweden and Russia. The number of Ingrians living in the former Soviet Union was estimated in the 1990s to be around 70,000 (Virtanen: 1992, 37). They lived predominately in the region around St. Petersburg; other Ingrian settlements are in Estonia. With the fall of the Iron Curtain, members of this ethnic group were given the right to leave the Soviet Union legally. In Finland, the Ingrians are regarded as ethnic Fins, so they have the right to 'return' to the country of their cultural origin. Ingrians receive a Finnish passport after their departure from the former Soviet Union, and are given the same social rights as autochthonous Fins. Since 1989, 20,000 Ingrians have left the area of the former Soviet Union and have settled in Finland (Modeen: 1999, 169).

The Finnish government's liberal immigration policy has not, however, been free of criticism. After the political break-up of the Soviet Union, minorities living there were granted extensive rights of cultural autonomy. In Finland, parliamentary representatives criticised the simple policy of "return" to Finland by saying that it would motivate young people to emigrate, and that this would amount to an "ethnic cleansing" in the Ingrian regions of the former Soviet Union (Lepola: 2002, 183). Moreover, it proved to be very difficult to incorporate the newly immigrated Ingrians into the Finnish labour market. The Finnish government's initial active 'return policy' was replaced shortly thereafter with a policy of economic and cultural support for the Ingrians in their countries of residency.

The implementing body of these supporting measures is the Finnish Department of Labour. It finances, coordinates and carries out projects in Russia and Estonia pertaining to the Ingrian Fin minority, including cultural, social and economic measures for this minority in order to create an alternative to migration. They are part of a general cooperation agreement between the countries at hand. One of the concrete measures here regards the establishment of multi-purpose service centres for older persons in the regions of Ingria and Karelia.

### *Repatriation support programmes for migrants*

When one looks at migration-oriented development aid measures in the past and present, it is clear that the predominant number of these measures was concerned with a client group composed of potential returnees. Unlike the development aid measures in the migrants' countries of origin, where the concrete effect on migration control is hard

to assess, in the case of development-oriented return support emerges an immediate connection between migrating subjects and the goals of development policies.

Since the recruiting of work immigrants was halted in the 1970s, development aid programmes promoting the voluntary return of migrants have been established in the European immigration countries. During this time, it became clear that the residency of the so-called guest workers would be often permanent, although their period of residency had been planned at first to be finite. Spontaneous, voluntary return after some years of residency did not become the rule, in contrast to the expectations of the time. Return support programmes frequently try to unite various different goals: first, the physical return of (legal or illegal) immigrants; secondly, the permanent return of the persons in question; thirdly, the support of local processes of development in the countries of origin; and finally, the reduction or, if possible, the avoidance of future migration from the regions in question (Koser: 2001, 6). To this end, state-run programmes of return support are made up of a combination of different measures, of which the basic support includes the assumption of return travel expenses and a one-time disbursement for the new start in the country of origin. Furthermore, some programmes grant subsidies for the establishment of small businesses and for vocational training. Some programmes bind individual repatriation support with aid for local development in the country of origin. In 2001, Khalid Koser presented a short study which examines newer repatriation support programmes with regards to their goals and their achieved results. The author emphasizes that, at present, considerable research deficits exist when it comes to making a comprehensive assessment of these programmes. The prerequisites needed in order to be able to judge the relevance of development

aid policy to repatriation support programmes do not exist. Moreover, clear cost-benefit analyses of remigration are not available: scholars can neither come to consensus on the effects of remittances from migrants into their country of origin (which are discontinued upon resettlement in the country of origin), nor can the effect of transfers of social capital and know-how through remigrants be adequately judged through the utilisation of the current research.

Since the 1970s, several return support programmes have been implemented in Germany. These, however, did not accomplish the goals placed upon them by the politicians responsible for their enactment. These consisted in their initial form in a lump sum for returning migrants. At first, no refund was planned of the payroll deductions paid into the German social security system. The remuneration of a lump sum amounting to ca. 25,000 German marks per departure-willing family (depending on the number of children) could not make good the losses of income to be expected in the country of origin. Another reason for the relative lack of success of this kind of return support was the fact that re-entry into Germany for work purposes was disallowed after the payment of the financial support. Presumably, the beneficiaries of this programme were predominantly those immigrants who were planning to return anyway to their countries of origin, so that they merely 'took' the offered support with them. Parallel to these financial incentives planned to motivate the repatriation of guest workers, the German Federal Government has been offering vocational training programmes for returning emigrants since the late 1970s; the goal here was to provide for a good professional positioning of returnees in their countries of origin. Also as early as the 1970s in Germany, programmes emerged to assist returnees in the

establishment of income-generating businesses (cf. Werth: 1981; Akder; Gitmez: 1981).<sup>7</sup>

The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) states in a document published in 1999 that 590 million German marks have been spent on repatriation support for migrants. In the document it is noted that ca. 11,000 persons and their families have benefited from this repatriation support. In particular, it points out that the professional qualification of certain groups of returnees is important for the economic development in the countries of origin. In this sense, the BMZ states that it is “meaningful for development aid policy to make the knowledge and experience of these qualified workers [qualified workers from developing countries are meant here; J.A.] useful for the development of their native countries, and, in the context of the BMZ’s resource cooperation, to support the returnees in the search for work and the establishment of small businesses” (BMZ: 1999, 80).

Our survey in 2001 shows that repatriation support programmes dominate the migration-oriented development aid policy in Germany. One explicit development aid oriented approach is adhered to by the CIM (Center for International Migration and Development). This centre is a parastatal institution financed by the BMZ. The CIM implements reintegration programmes for qualified employees from developing countries who have received their vocational training in Germany, and who, as highly qualified migrants, are willing to return to their countries of origin in order to assume work that is important from a development aid policy standpoint. The CIM informs applicants of corresponding job offers in their countries of origin, grants temporary salary subsidies, provides for reintegration support and gives returnees lump sums for return travel and moving expenses.

The German Investment and Development Company (DEG) in Cologne is also engaged in providing support for returnees. As mandated by the BMZ and working on the basis of bilateral intergovernmental agreements, this organisation grants loans for the establishment of small businesses in nine countries (2001). The client group supported by this organisation is made up of returning qualified workers who have completed their studies or vocational training in Germany. In this regard, the programme is not exclusively oriented towards migrants. Support resources available include subsidies for return travel and moving expenses, for training purposes, as well as for equipment needed at the work place. In order to receive these support resources, migrants have to have received either basic or advanced job qualification training in Germany in the field of work which is to be supported. Seminars are also held in the context of programmes providing for loans for the establishment of new businesses. These seminars, though, are mainly held in the countries of origin. In 2001, the DEG carried out programmes in Albania, Chile, Eritrea, Croatia, Macedonia, the Palestinian-controlled areas, Slovenia, Turkey and Vietnam (together with the AGEF, see below). Support programmes were in preparation for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The DEG pursues the following goals with its programmes: the creation of jobs and the development of small and medium-sized business structures in developing and the so-called reform countries through the establishment of small private businesses; the export of technical know-how and expertise; and a lasting safeguarding of the basic living conditions for founders of new businesses in development and reform countries. The DEG offers long-term loans for the establishment of small businesses at low interest rates, between 100,000 and 300,000 German marks (50,000–150,000 Euro, depending on the country at



hand). With these loans, the establishment of businesses can be subsidised along with investments relating to the expansion of or the acquisition of existing enterprises, as well as the cooperation in existing enterprises.

The Association of Experts in the Fields of Migration and Development Cooperation (AGEF) is presumably the largest agency in Germany that carries out reintegration measures for returning migrants. The AGEF was founded in 1992 as a charitable corporation, and functions as an independent organisation in the fields of consultation and implementation of development cooperation, international migration, as well as environmental protection and resource management. Among other things, the AGEF provides consulting services for foreigners in Germany in questions pertaining to professional integration and reintegration, develops and implements projects for the professional and social reintegration for returnees and provides for preparatory measures before return. AGEF also functions as an implementing organisation under mandate from the BMZ, the European Union, the German Federal Labour Office and the office responsible for returning work migrants, namely the Head Office for Job Placement (ZAV) in Frankfurt/Main. According to its website, the AGEF focused on the following measures in 2001: the implementation of employment exchanges for returning Bosnian civil war refugees, as well as for returning refugees from Kosovo, Asia and Africa. In 2001, the AGEF focused its activities in Europe on Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo; furthermore, countries in southern Africa, as well as East and Southeast Asia were areas of activity for the AGEF. AGEF also implements reintegration programmes under the mandate of the Christian organisation Overseas Service (Dienst in Übersee) ([www.agef.de/agef/artikel/wir.htm](http://www.agef.de/agef/artikel/wir.htm); detailed information on reintegration:

[www.reintegration.net/reintegration/rückkehr/inhalt.htm](http://www.reintegration.net/reintegration/rückkehr/inhalt.htm)).

AGEF's activities are either consultative or financial. In general, citizens of developing countries who have either received basic or advanced job training or have worked professionally over a period of years in Germany can apply for repatriation support. Such returnees can apply for training and wage subsidies, as well as subsidies to cover return travel and moving expenses. According to the organisation's guidelines, returnees to "least developed countries" and to those countries with which Germany has concluded bilateral agreements (i.e. Turkey, Chile, Eritrea and Vietnam) receive preferential support. The applicants should, when possible, be able to show that they already have been promised work in their countries of origin. The programme is financed by the BMZ, as are most other programmes.

AGEF implements different employment exchanges for foreign students and work migrants who plan to repatriate, although they have not already found employment. By means of these employment exchanges, possible job openings in the countries of origin are advertised, and the AGEF also looks for suitable applicants for job vacancies in developing countries. The reintegration of migrants trained in the medical professions forms a main emphasis of these employment exchange activities.

Together with the World University Service (WUS), the AGEF supports organisations of repatriated qualified employees in different countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. These organisations are open for qualified workers who have received either basic or advanced job training in Germany, and who work towards the professional and social integration of returnees in their countries of origin. On the other hand, these organisations attempt to further

impulses for development policy, for example, those towards the support of founders of new enterprises, towards the intermediation of business contacts in Germany, and so on. BMZ provides for the funding here as well.

Finally, support programmes for Turkish returnees and for the repatriation of foreign workers from Central and eastern European countries should be mentioned. These programmes are carried out by the Coordination Agency for Professional Mobility and Integration in Foreign Countries (KMI), which is financed by the Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs. The KMI is a charitable agency organised by the Institute of the German Economy. It supports the repatriation of migrants and their professional reintegration in their countries of origin. The KMI focusses its activities on Turkey, and it has various contacts to organisations in the German and Turkish economies. Its activities include consulting services, seminars on the establishment of new enterprises, as well as the intermediation of employment opportunities in countries of origin.

Without question, the above-mentioned programmes are engaged in enacting development aid policy. This engagement can be seen through the selection of the countries from which returnees are supported. The programmes that are not restricted according to specific countries of origin prefer to support applicants from the "poorest countries" (according to the DAC list). Normally, the intention behind these development programmes is to make the utilisation of human resources which have been trained and/or qualified in Germany available for development in the countries of origin. In practice, though, this process is mainly unilateral, because the selection of the recipients occurs on an individual basis in accordance with the guidelines of the German programme sponsors. Moreover, the need for qualification measures is determined almost exclusively

by the German side of the partnership. The French strategy of *codéveloppement* differs from the German strategy here.<sup>8</sup> Although *codéveloppement* utilises many instruments similar to the German strategy (repatriation support, specific professional qualification, support for the establishment of enterprises), the latter is neither coupled on bilateral agreements, nor are the support measures integrated in the development strategies of the individual countries of origin. In principle, all measures for repatriation support in Germany are only available to foreigners who have legal residency permits. Repatriation support for illegal immigrants is not provided for in Germany, in contrast to France's PDML programme (see below).

Questions regarding the repatriation of migrants are often researched at universities in Germany. As a rule, this research is comprised of case studies in the context of regional research. In the course of our inquiry, we have not become aware of university research which has undertaken the compilation of information concerning our topic. However, there are independent scientific institutions which currently do explicit research on the migration-development nexus. The Centre for Development Research in Copenhagen is one, another is the Panos Institute in Paris. As early as in the 1980s an intensive debate on this nexus has been conducted at the Berlin Institute for Comparative Social Research.

Since the end of the 1970s, different programmes have also been established to support the voluntary repatriation in France. This so-called *aide au retour* was applied especially to unemployed migrants from Southern Europe, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. The first programmes of this type varied in their focus, but all concentrated on providing for one-time financial repatriation support and professional training measures for repatriates, as were the

programmes in Germany. Between 1984 and 1993, 31,648 migrants took part in a programme for “reintegration support” for returnees (although when one considers all family members, 71,623 persons were affected by this programme) (Rogers: 1997, 154). This programme was aimed at unemployed immigrants in France, and it focused on their reintegration in the countries of origin through support for the establishment of businesses. However, the number of the participants declined over time. This decline resulted from the devastating economic situation in the countries of origin and the appropriately low standard of living in the case of repatriation. These bleak perspectives are presumably the reason why all of the French government’s attempts to persuade legal and even illegal immigrants to return voluntarily to their countries of origin failed.

In the 1990s, several repatriation programmes with specific development aid policy goals were implemented for the so-called *sans papier* migrants in France.<sup>9</sup>

- The Programme Développement Local-Migration (PDLM) places its emphasis on aiding the establishment of enterprises by returnees to Mali and Senegal. In 1999, 49 loans were granted for this purpose in Mali and 20 in Senegal. The loans in Mali averaged 23,500 FF (3,600 Euro), in Senegal 22,500 FF (3,430 Euro). According to Koser, this programme has yet to be evaluated; detailed profiles of the returnees funded by this programme are also not available, nor are budget details for the programme available (Koser: 2001, 18).
- The programme Contrat de Réinsertion dans le Pays d’Origine (CRPO) was implemented in 1999 and makes it possible for *sans papiers* to legally reside in France for three months in order to prepare for their return. The programme was still in the pilot phase in 2001; 18 Malians

and 11 Senegalese had taken part in the programme up to 2001. An evaluation of the programme has not been published (Koser: 2001, 19).

- The Programme Co-Développement Migration (PCDM) has been in the implementation phase since 1988. The target group consists primarily of immigrants from Romania whose application for asylum was refused. The programme provides for repatriation support through both loans for the establishment of businesses (in 1999 the average sum was 23,600 FF [3,600 Euro]) and also through subsidies for vocational training measures after the return to Romania. Koser reports that 330 families (altogether 907 persons) returned to Romania by means of this programme in the year 2000. The budget for the fiscal year 2000 amounted to approximately 2.25 million FF (343,000 Euro) (Koser: 2001, 19).

Next to the explicit orientation of these programmes towards development, it should be stressed that these programmes also try to integrate local NGOs in the various countries of origin into their planning.<sup>10</sup>

In other European countries, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, different programmes of repatriation support have also been established since the 1980s. Only in some cases were these programmes combined with explicit components of a development aid policy. Although the programme to be discussed here is fairly old, it will be looked at due to its exemplary relevance to development efforts. In 1974, a programme was implemented in the Netherlands which explicitly dealt with combatting the causes of work migration in the countries of origin. For the first time, economic development in migrants' countries of origin was named as a goal of a project. In the context of the REMPLOD programme (Reintegration of Emigrant

Manpower and the Promotion of Local Opportunities for Development), proposals for future projects for the Netherlands' Ministry for Development Cooperation were worked out for five countries of origin from which work migrants come. According to these proposals, returnees were to be included in local development projects as founders of new businesses. These new businesses were to be founded not only for the returnees themselves, but also in order to aid in creating the structural conditions needed for rural development. However, after only two years of project implementation and intensive research accompanying this implementation in Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia, it was recommended that the programme be halted. Instead, development cooperation was to then concentrate on the creation of jobs in underdeveloped countries in a wider sense without special consideration on returning emigrants. Despite this negative recommendation, a small portion of the REMPLOD funds was further dedicated to supporting the establishment of new businesses by remigrants. The prerequisites for participation in the programme were high: participants needed a good professional qualification, an elaborate plan for the establishment of a new business in a promising business sector, as well as a considerable amount of capital. Once the support was approved, it covered comprehensive consultation services as well as low-interest loans.

Although the programme and the approved projects produced good results, REMPLOD was halted in 1984 by the Dutch government. The reasons given were that the results did not justify the high costs of the programme, and that such support for returnees was generally not accordance with the spirit of the new Dutch politics on minorities (Rogers: 1997, 159).

The work that Novib (Netherlands Organisation for International Development Co-operation) has undertaken deserves special notice. Novib is one of the five largest NGOs in the Netherlands that specialises in development aid policy work, and it carries out various projects for the Dutch Department of Development Cooperation throughout the world. Novib works together with migrants and refugees in the Netherlands, and supports these in empowerment processes and in the creation of competencies related to development aid policy in migrants' self-organisations. Novib provides 400 million NFL (181 million Euro) per annum for the support of migrant and refugee projects in the context of development aid and in cooperation with the migrants' countries of origin. The organisation sees itself as committed to the goal of sustainable development in the southern countries. Novib primarily supports projects emphasizing the support of human rights, women's rights, ecology and sustainable development; the regional focal point of the organisation's work is Africa. These projects must, however, be co-financed from other sources or by counterparts in the project countries. Support for the projects applied for by migrants and refugees in the Netherlands must be clearly relevant to both development efforts in their countries of origin and to the situation of migrants and refugees in the Netherlands. At the same time, such projects should contribute to the integration of migrants and refugees into the Dutch society.

In particular, the programme Arc Mundi (Awareness Raising - Multicultural Networks in Development Initiatives) contains aspects of the connection between development cooperation and integration in the Netherlands. This programme was implemented in 1998, and was planned for a duration of three years. In an information folder, Novib formulates the primary objective of Arc Mundi as



follows: "to achieve equal co-operation between various spheres of activity of development cooperation, and those of multiculturalism with a view to the structural alleviation of poverty in developing countries". Arc Mundi is carried out by Novib in cooperation with three other Dutch organisations. An example of a project sponsored by Arc Mundi is a school project in Somalia which was carried out in 2000. In this project, Novib cooperated with the organisation "Hirda" (Himilo Relief and Development Association), an organisation founded in 1998 from Somalis in the Netherlands and with the goal of supporting a school in the war-torn Somalian city of Bardera with 25,000 NFL (11,300 Euro) per annum. Novib supports this cooperation established by refugees in the Netherlands through additional funds utilised for a more extensive construction of schools in Bardera. Moreover, Novib supports the reconstruction of Somalia by supporting the attempts to safeguard the drinking water supply and by providing small loans for women.

With support from Novib, the Economic Resource Centre for Overseas Filipinos (ERCOF) was founded at the end of the 1990s. This centre researches the utilisation of migrants' remittances for rural development in the Philippines. The ERCOF plans on building a forum through which the role of Philippine emigrants in a wider sense is to be discussed. Here, an assessment is to be made over whether, and to what extent, the ERCOF can be expanded to include other migrants' countries of origin (Novib Information Folder).

Furthermore, programmes exist in the Netherlands which support the establishment of businesses by immigrants. The programme "IntEnt" (Internationalisation of Entrepreneurship) helps immigrated entrepreneurs and tradespersons establish joint ventures or found new

enterprises in the countries of origin. The programme presently supports immigrants and entrepreneurs from Ghana, Morocco, Suriname and Turkey and shall be expanded to other countries of origin in future.

### *The IOM's programmes of assisted return*

Notably, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) has specialised internationally in programmes of assisted return. The IOM works together with other international organisations (UNHCR, UNDP, as well as NGOs involved with flight and migration), and develops programmes for the repatriation of migrants. IOM is an organisation which was created to handle planned migration. Refugees and migrants, particularly those without legal or lasting residency status, are among their programme members. The programmes are often involved with offering these a more humane solution than forced deportation. The IOM is first and foremost an operational organisation. Since the 1980s, however, development aid policy goals have been more and more evident in its projects. In this regard, repatriation support appears to be no longer valid as a lasting solution for containing illegal migration. The goals, according to the IOM, should instead be the operation of an effective management of international migration and the fight against the pressure towards emigration in the countries of origin. The IOM works together with different African and European governments to find an answer to how individual repatriation support for illegal migrants can be combined with development aid policy impulses for the countries of origin.

The IOM maintains an extensive web of regional offices in numerous countries around the world. Several

regional offices participated in our survey. Moreover, several project reports from the IOM regional office for the Baltic and Nordic countries are available on the internet ([iwww.iom.fi](http://iwww.iom.fi)). Here, the following project information can be found: the return process and professional reintegration of Kosovo Albanians from Finland; the return process and reintegration of refugees who were denied asylum in Finland. Another more specialised programme is concerned itself with the return process of asylum-seeking individuals from eastern Europe countries from Belgium, Finland and the Netherlands, as well as with the return process of migrants who become stranded in the Baltic states. These programmes do not all contain a specific development aid policy approach.

The IOM's so-called RQN programmes (Return of Qualified Nationals) differ, however, from those previously described. The RQN programmes are solely concerned with the repatriation of qualified migrants who intend to use their professional abilities for the social and economic development of their countries of origin. The programmes' regional focal point is Africa. According to the IOM's homepage, Africa is primarily affected by the loss of highly qualified human resources ([site.mweb.co.zw/iom/activities.htm](http://site.mweb.co.zw/iom/activities.htm)). Temporary vocational training and employment in foreign countries frequently led to permanent residency in these countries. In 1983, the IOM implemented the RQAN programme (Return of Qualified African Nationals), a programme which organises the return of qualified citizens of African countries. This programme was co-financed by the Commission of the European Community in the context of the Lomé-II Agreement. The RQAN programme came to a close in 1999; during the 16 years of its implementation more than 6,000 highly qualified Africans who worked primarily in Europe and in North America,

returned to Africa through this programme. The RQUN (Return and Reintegration of Qualified Ugandan Nationals), an extensive sub-programme of the RQAN, focused on the repatriation of Ugandans. The IOM regional office in London carried out this sub-programme in cooperation with the government of Uganda and with financial support from the EU. The goal set by this programme was to place highly qualified returnees directly into key positions of the Ugandan labour market, so that they could make a contribution to the economic development of the country. The support made available by the IOM through these programmes consisted in return travel expenses, the shipment of household goods, the support for the acquisition of work-related equipment and reintegration support. The support differed according to the individual needs of the returnees. In addition, a monitoring of the reintegration and professional development of those supported in Uganda was offered ([www.iomlondon.org/rqun.html](http://www.iomlondon.org/rqun.html)).

After the RQAN programmes closed in 1999, the IOM planned in 2001 to reimplement those repatriation programmes that had been judged to be successful. The programme "Migration for Development for Africa" (MIDA) has started in the beginning of 2002. This programme also intends to revert the 'brain-drain' and to close gaps in the web of human resources in the African countries. In comparison with previous programmes this programme differs only through a more flexible application of the possible implementation measures. The measures no longer solely include supporting a permanent return of the highly qualified, but also take into account the possibilities of a temporary return, as well as a "virtual return" in the context of modern communication technologies ([site.web.co.zw/iom/activities.htm](http://site.web.co.zw/iom/activities.htm); downloaded on 26 October 2001). This new flexibility is one instance in which development aid

policy aspects begin to succeed against a mere policy of reducing migration.

### *Successes and failures of repatriation support*

In the 1990s, repatriation support became more and more important to international migration politics. Unlike a policy of the mere deportation of immigrants without valid residency permits, regulated repatriation strategies attempt to implement an effective reintegration of returnees in their countries of origin. Nevertheless, if one looks at conventional repatriation support programmes with recognisable migration controlling goals, the success of these programmes in the various European Union countries has been rather moderate, especially given the continuously high level of immigration. Rosemary Rogers has examined the different repatriation support programmes implemented through the mid-1990s and has drawn conclusions about their weaknesses (Rogers: 1997, 162-163). Many of the programmes were primarily concerned with the weakest segment of the migrant population, namely unemployed migrants. The programmes have, as a rule, disallowed the possibility of a re-immigration at a later date for the purpose of gaining employment. The economic reality for the emigrants returning to their countries of origin has not exactly been auspicious. Studies on Turkish emigrants returning to Turkey from Germany show that 50 percent of the returnees have been unable to find stable employment (Rogers: 1997, 162). In the first programmes, repatriation support measures in the European immigration countries were aimed at all nationalities in the migrant population. With the expansion of the European Community, the programmes were then aimed at migrants who were not from

EC countries (particularly Turks, Maghreb Africans and, in France, Black Africans). Altogether, the levels of participation in the offered programmes were rather low; often, those who participated had planned to return anyway. The programmes in question differed from one another through the creation of incentives for return (i.e. return premiums) on the one hand, and through support for a lasting reintegration in the country of origin on the other hand. Effective programmes of the latter type are cost-intensive and are deferred therefore in favour of a broader development aid policy by some immigration countries, as clearly shown by the REMPLOD project's strategy in the Netherlands, discussed above. Moreover, the decision to repatriate is not only determined by the available incentives for return, but rather also by the opportunities available in the countries of origin (Rogers: 1997, 163).

How the migrants' countries of origin are included in the planning and implementation of these different repatriation programmes is crucial in determining policy aspects of development aid. Strategies of sustainable development can only be formulated by the affected countries themselves. Repatriation support relevant to development policy presupposes that a reconciliation of interests occurs between immigration countries and countries of origin, most often in the form of bilateral agreements. The previous examples show that the French strategy of *codéveloppement* has formulated the most elaborate approach towards combining repatriation support with development aid policy.<sup>11</sup> Here, bilateral agreements are met on both the local and the national level. In contrast to this strategy, most early measures consisted of one-sided repatriation support, and did not take into consideration the interests of the countries of origin. The countries from which guest workers migrate suffer less from a brain drain of human

capital, but rather are interested in being able to export their labour market problems through allowing for work migrants. Moreover, it becomes clear that only a small segment of migrants make up an attractive client group of development-oriented repatriation support, namely the highly qualified segment of migrants who would most likely have few labour market difficulties in the immigration countries. Since a shortage of highly qualified labour is found in the industrial countries, it remains to be seen whether initiatives such as the IOM's Return of Qualified Nationals programme are influential, and how long-term this influence will be.

Some of the projects mentioned above, such as those in the Netherlands, can be referred back to new developments in the 1990s through which migrants are increasingly seen as actors in the development of international economic relations. Research on transnationalism looks at migration under the conditions of a globalised economy: Transnational spheres are formed between countries of origin. Migration is regarded here as a continual phenomenon concerning individuals and their communities. Often, returning to the country of origin does not mean the end of a migration cycle, but rather another iteration in a process of continual mobility (Ammassari and Black: 2001, 18). Therefore, the question should be: which type of politics is necessary to mobilise the resources of these migrant communities for the development of their countries of origin. In practice, this mobilisation would mean a decided renunciation of the concept of preventing migration. A renunciation of this sort, however, appears to be impossible for those European governments adhering to restrictive migration policies. The French policy of *codéveloppement* is the first state-run attempt to implement support strategies for transnational development. Within the next few years

it will be possible to observe whether a promising strategy for a migration-oriented development aid policy will ensue out of this example.

### *The repatriation of refugees*

Until quite recently, recognised asylum status was linked with lasting residency permits in western countries. As a rule, a refugee who had found asylum took up lasting residency in that asylum country. This practice was possible because for decades after World War II the countries of western Europe and North America had not been affected by mass flight movements, exceptions being the movements after the rebellions in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. But even in these two cases, asylum seekers spread out over different host countries and became residents of these countries. For decades, though, there have been many forms of temporary asylum in the countries of the third world. This practice was based on the broad definition of the term “refugee” in accordance with the Geneva Refugee Convention and further determined by regional refugee conventions (the OAU Convention, the Cartagena Declaration). These conventions defined not only genuine “political” refugees, but also civil war refugees and environmental refugees. In the end, between 1945 and 1989 it was third world countries where mass flight movements took place (Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia and others). In the course of these mass flight movements, again and again repatriation programmes became necessary, which due to their immense size required the use of international organisations. As a rule, these mass repatriations were carried out under the direction the UNHCR.



The Geneva Refugee Convention contains no explicit references to a possible cessation of refugee status. Article 33 forbids the sending back of refugees to the country of origin when life or freedom is threatened. In Article 34, the ratifying states of the convention are called on to provide for assimilation and naturalisation as soon as possible for refugees who are recognised as such. The repatriation of recognized refugees occurred solely on a voluntary basis. In practice, though, several modifications to these norms have been made over time. Many host countries of asylum seekers have since formulated subtle distinctions through the creation of categories of residency permits for such refugees who did not strictly correspond to the definition of the term "refugee" in the Convention. In Germany, a temporary toleration of certain groups of refugees was implemented. These groups were primarily made up of civil war refugees (from Lebanon and Sri Lanka for example), and in practice such refugees were given a temporary refugee status.

Most recently, the refugee catastrophe in the former Yugoslavia led the European countries to the realisation that the regulations laid out in the Geneva Refugee Convention no longer suffice for the new realities of flight and persecution. In this case, a concept of temporary protection was developed for the refugees of the Yugoslavian civil war. In contradiction to the Geneva Refugee Convention, this temporary protection does not provide for the social integration of those seeking protection in the host countries, and it even assumes from the start that the refugees' stay in the host country is temporary. In the course of these events, the UNHCR has also taken an increasingly pragmatic standpoint on the repatriation of refugees. More and more, the UNHCR has moved away from earlier standpoints which envisaged a repatriation only in the case of complete paci-

fication and resolution of the flight causing conflict, as well as restoration of good chances for reintegration. Instead the UNHCR moves towards a support of repatriation even in less perfect conditions.

The repatriation of refugees in the cases of civil wars or natural disasters frequently presupposes that the reconstruction of destroyed countries occurs and that re-settlement can be long-lasting. In such situations, development aid projects are envisaged which combine the cessation of temporary refugee statuses in host countries with the reconstruction and structural support of the countries of origin. A good example for such a combination of repatriation and international reconstruction support can be found in the International Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA), which took place in 1987 in accordance with the Esquipulas Peace Agreement and from which a successful return programme resulted. The giving countries, primarily the Scandinavian countries and Italy, bore not only the costs for the repatriation, but also financed development aid projects which increased the prospects for a lasting re-settlement of the returnees (Rogers: 1997, 168). A counter-example is found in the repatriation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan and Iran in the 1990s: the giving countries were neither willing to finance reconstruction projects, nor to further development aid projects in Afghanistan since the prospects of a lasting peace in Afghanistan appeared to be uncertain.

Usually, the infrastructure in the countries of origin of re-migrating refugees has been destroyed, and income-securing measures must be created again. Aid for re-migrating refugees are necessary on three levels: firstly, the repatriation itself must be funded. This includes the registration of claimants, return travel and transportation costs, the construction of reception centres in the countries

of origin and the funding of goods that are immediately necessary upon arrival in the country of origin (food, tools, seed, building materials etc.). Secondly, a minimal reconstruction of infrastructure must be ensured in order to effectively bring about the re-settlement, i.e. the restoration of bridges and streets, the repair of schools and a guaranteed provision of medical care. Thirdly, long-term development aid measures are in demand. Rogers explicitly refers to the situation in Central America at the end of the 1980s, when the UNHCR succeeded in bringing the UNDP into development projects in order to combine measures for returnees with longer-term development projects (1997, 169). An example was the Development Programme for displaced Persons, Refugees and Returnees in Central America (PRODERE), which formed the most important programme in the context of the CIREFCA. This programme was financed by the Italian government with a project size of 115 million US dollars, and was carried out by the UNDP in cooperation with the UNHCR, the ILO and the WHO (World Health Organisation). PRODERE was implemented in 1988.

In the survey carried out in 2001, the sponsored project measures in the context of refugee repatriation were dominated by the repatriation of refugees from the former Yugoslavia. It can be assumed that all European countries who took on refugees from the former Yugoslavia are carrying out repatriation projects that, after the transfer costs, frequently consist of support for reintegration and reconstruction, i.e. for the lasting re-settlement of the refugees. In the 1990s, refugees from the former Yugoslavia were given a TP status (Temporary Protection), which allowed for a cessation of residency in the host countries at the end of war in the former Yugoslavia. The concept of the TP status, propagated by the host countries as an optimal

solution, was to allow for the voluntary return of refugees at the end of the civil war. These refugees could then be, under suitable conditions, re-settled in their regions of origin. This concept was shared by the UNHCR. After the conclusion of the Dayton Accord at the end of 1995, the issue concerning the return of refugees became current, and it also became clear that the conditions for a promising re-settlement had to be developed before re-settlement began. The proclaimed 'return in dignity' could only be 'bought' through various forms of compensation from those host countries who by no means wished to allow the temporary refugees take up a permanent residency.<sup>12</sup> As early as 1992, the Norwegian government presented a support programme for the voluntary return of citizens of the former Yugoslavia. This programme contained financial support, the refund of travelling expenses, as well as health insurance for the duration of one year. Furthermore, it allowed for developmental aid measures which were intended to benefit the whole local population in the countries of origin (Joly: 2001, 100).

In Germany, a large number of return support programmes for Yugoslavian refugees were enacted on the federal and state levels, of which only a few can be discussed here. The state of Berlin, for example, has implemented return programmes for refugees from Kosovo and from Bosnia-Herzegovina. In March of 1999, the Berlin Senate established a new grant programme for the initial support of returning Bosnian refugees, on that is based on several older programmes. Repatriation takes place in the context of the REAG programme (Reintegration and Emigration Programme for Asylum-Seekers in Germany), which provides for funding of return travel expenses, and the GARP programme (Government Assisted Repatriation Programme), which provides for reintegration aid. Both

of these programmes are financed by the EU. The actual payment of the reintegration aid is made through the local offices of the IOM in the country of origin. The German federal government assumes 50 percent of the costs for each returning refugee. Furthermore, the State of Berlin contributes to the financial support of returnees out of its own funds. The repatriation support amounted to 1,000 Euro through mid-2000 per returning person (at maximum 3,000 Euro per family) and was then lowered to 750 Euro per person (at maximum 2,250 Euro per family). In addition to the financial support of the actual return process, a vocational training initiative for Bosnia has also been established in Berlin. One of the projects being prepared for implementation is a pilot project for the voluntary return of Bosnian Roma in their regions of origin in the Tuzla-Podrinje Canton, which, in 1999, received 695,000 Euro in support from the Social Development Fund of the Council of Europe and the European Commission. The State of Berlin offers reconstruction aid for municipalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina that are willing to take in refugees, under the prerequisite that these municipalities have projects that can be immediately enacted. The financial reconstruction aid for municipalities is calculated according to the number of refugees taken in, and amounts to 1,000 Euro per supported returnee (at maximum 4,000 Euro per returning family) in 2000 (Ausländerbeauftragte des Berliner Senats, Returnee Programme 2000 for Refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina). Similar aid programmes for returning refugees from Kosovo have also been planned and similar programmes have also been established in other states in Germany. The programmes in Berlin have been emphasized here because Berlin had taken in up to 30,000 Bosnian refugees, and therefore carried an enormous burden for the refugees' accommodation and care. Even when these

measures are referred to again and again as reconstruction aid, it cannot be overlooked that an important reason for Berlin's policies was to escape the financial burden that the refugees posed.

Other programmes emphasise the return of highly qualified refugees to key positions in their countries of origin, so that these refugees can make a contribution to the reconstruction of war-shattered countries. Beginning at the end of 1996, the IOM has carried out a programme for Bosnian returnees, which has similarities to the RQN programme (Return of Qualified Nationals) described above. The project is managed through the IOM's regional office in Sarajevo. By the end of 1999, almost 800 highly qualified refugees were repatriated under this programme. Provisions were made for the support of employers who offered employment for qualified returning refugees: They received subsidies for loan and employment costs for 12 months. According to the IOM almost 85 percent of these returnees remained employed after the expiry of the 12 month subsidies. The project was planned originally for the long term, but was phased out in 1999 for two reasons: project funds had become scarce and it became more difficult to find suitable returnees. For the year 2000 and later, the regional office in Sarajevo planned further RQN projects through which the reform of the justice system in Bosnia-Herzegovina was to be assisted. Return projects have also been conceived with regard to development support for the private sector. Here, the repatriation of entrepreneurs is to be supported, and the registration process for the establishment of new enterprises is to be made easier ([www.iom.int/offices/Bosnia-Herzegovina/RQN.htm](http://www.iom.int/offices/Bosnia-Herzegovina/RQN.htm)).

Numerous repatriation support projects for Albanian refugees from Kosovo were conceived by the different

European host countries as well. During the Kosovo crisis, about 800,000 Kosovars had escaped into other parts of Kosovo (from a total of 2.2 million), to neighbouring countries and to western Europe. In 2000, between 350,000 and 400,000 Kosovo-Albanians lived in Germany. From these, a large number were work migrants and their families who were already living in Germany at the time of the crisis. Special return programmes have been established to make repatriation attractive for those who sought refuge in the 1990s, and those who were given a temporary residency status. Until March 2000, 60,000 Kosovo-Albanians were to return from Germany to their country of origin; a further 180,000 should follow (Balaj: 2001). During our survey, it was reported that repatriation support for Albanians in Greece is provided for through a project of the International Social Service (Hellenic Branch). The ISS is a partner organisation in an EU project for the repatriation of Albanians in Greece, and is primarily focused on vocational training measures. The project Computer Skills Training Programme for the Repatriation Albanian Citizens was carried out with 40 Albanians living in Greece and willing to return. Another project, the Repatriation Programme for Albanian Citizens (REPAC), was carried out between the summer of 1999 and the beginning of 2000. This project was also aimed at Albanians in Greece who were willing to repatriate. The programme was aimed at preparing the participants for return and increasing their chances of economic and social integration in their country of origin. Furthermore, the project was aimed at contributing to the social, economic and technological development of structural conditions in Albania. Integration measures for the labour market were also enacted.

To show the wide spectrum of the measures implemented here, some further projects of remigration sup-

port for refugees shall be mentioned. Currently, Caritas Switzerland is carrying out a project for displaced persons who return to their native Ethiopia after the end of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The project operates in the Ethiopian Irob District which had been occupied by Eritrean troops until May 2000. The region has been supervised by UN soldiers since the end of the occupation and the removal of the Eritrean troops. Approximately 40,000 Ethiopians were displaced during the occupation; in the meantime, they are gradually returning to the region. The Caritas project concentrates on the creation of jobs for the returnees, as well as on the reconstruction of their villages. Damaged wells and streets are also to be reconstructed. The duration of the project was from the beginning of October 2000 to the end of 2001. Caritas funds the project with 660,000 Swiss Francs (442,000 Euro).

In France, return support for applicants for political asylum, who have been refused asylum but are willing to repatriate, has been offered since 1991. This support covers return travel expenses and provides 150 Euro cash per adult and 45 Euro per child. In addition, a file on every returnee is put together and sent to the IOM in the country of origin in hope that the organisation can somehow help with the reintegration of the returnee. In Belgium, refused applicants for political asylum have been supported since 1984 (the REAB programme; although here with very few participants); the REAG programme in Germany and the REAN programme in the Netherlands have offered similar support measures since the mid-1990s (Rogers: 1997, 185ff.).

In the Netherlands, a repatriation support programme was in place from 1997 to 2001. This programme had a client group which consisted of refused applicants for political asylum from Angola and Ethiopia. It provided for



financial support, for several months of vocational training in the Netherlands, as well as for possible funds for community-oriented reintegration projects pertaining to returnees. Of 300 possible Ethiopian returnees, 14 returned to their country of origin by the end of 1999 by means of this programme. Due to the political uncertainty in Angola, no Angolan applicant who had been denied political asylum was deported from the Netherlands. The costs of the programme between the end of 1996 and the end of 1999 amounted to one million Euro (Koser: 2001, 16ff.).

In the Czech Republic, the Ministry of Interior, which is responsible for asylum and migration policy, also carried out different repatriation programmes for refugees from the former Yugoslavia with a TP status in the 1990s. In the first place, the programme was concerned with the reconstruction of residential and public buildings, as well as with aid for traumatised refugees. In the year 2000, programmes were carried out in Kosovo, in Chechnya, in the Ukraine and in Afghanistan. In Chechnya, houses were rebuilt for returnees from refugee camps in Ingushetia. In the Ukraine, advice centres for refugee and migration issues were set up in three cities. This project was primarily concerned with the prevention of illegal migration. The programme in Afghanistan was aimed at re-settling internal refugees in northern Afghanistan.

During our survey, we received information from several European governments stating that development questions did not form any explicit basis for consideration when supporting refugees in repatriation processes. A link between repatriation and aspects of development policy is infrequently found in the context of single projects. In many cases, repatriation support projects are often combined with vocational training measures for persons who, upon return, are to be relevant to development.

The efficiency of the repatriation programmes mentioned above is often reduced due to problematic aspects of the programmes themselves. The frequent low number of participants in such programmes should be mentioned here. This is a clear indication that it is more lucrative for many immigrants whose applications for asylum has been denied and whose residency permit will not be lengthened, to remain illegally in the countries of immigration and to find employment in the informal sector rather than to return to their countries of origin with a one-time compensation. Moreover, these programmes often have high costs in comparison to the small number of actual repatriations.

As with the return of work migrants, one should question what contribution returning refugees can actually make for the reconstruction of their countries. War-shattered countries in particular suffer from overstressed real estate and labour markets, in which returnees only create more stress (Balaj: 2001). In contrast, it has been stated in official announcements again and again that returnees are desperately needed for the reconstruction of their countries of origin. Barbara Balaj examined the return conditions of Kosovo Albanians at the beginning of this decade, and came to the conclusion that the key economic position of emigrants actually results from their remittances to their countries of origin. According to Balaj, almost 80 percent of the population in Kosovo receives monthly transfers from members of their families living abroad. These remittances make up approximately 45 percent of all private earnings in Kosovo (before the war: 25 percent). One should be sceptical, therefore, of whether the return of refugees actually contributes to economic reconstruction (Balaj: 2001).

Different forms of support have not been examined intensely with regard to their efficiency. In general, however, the large organisations involved with refugee support

have recognised that the resettlement of refugees requires measures that are coordinated with the situation of the whole population in the region concerned. The UNHCR has changed its repatriation policy accordingly within the last few decades so that, if possible, temporary protective measures can be offered in the countries of return even after the resettlement. Such approaches can be recognized as a stronger interlocking of refugee support and development aid policy, and one notices here a more flexible handling of UNHCR mandates, as a reply to the changed conditions of flight and return.

Nevertheless, it cannot be overlooked that suitable public institutions are needed for creating a stronger link between the rehabilitation of refugees and development aid policy, and for providing for a more effective control instrument for work in this field. The UNHCR has neither a mandate, nor the necessary resources for carrying out longer-term development measures in returnees' countries. Although the UNDP committed itself at the end of the 1980s to the peace process in Central America, it is not an operative organisation that can carry out and manage suitable projects on its own. The World Bank has so far shown little interest in refugee and migrant problems. Thus, only bilateral state-implemented development aid currently helps bring about the necessary reconstruction support needed for a lasting resettlement.

In his recently published study, Koser mentions that informal talks took place between some EU member states (Belgium, Germany, France, and the UK) with regard to common European return support programmes. However, these consultations failed because the discussed clientele, namely refused applicants for political asylum, are too diverse in their countries of origin to make an agreement

possible on a common support for individual countries of origin (Koser: 2001, 17).

### **Other forms of migration-oriented development policy**

In the previous sections, different forms of supported re-settlement of work migrants and refugees were described in detail. As our survey of the active organisations in the field of development policy has yielded, these different forms of support dominate migration-oriented measures of development aid. Broader forms of support did not play a role in our survey. Nevertheless, discussions on broader forms of support will be outlined here. These involve trade liberalisation, foreign direct investments and direct foreign development aid. When looking at these discussions, it becomes clear that practicable models have yet to be developed for combining migration control with meaningful aspects of development aid policy.

#### *Trade liberalisation*

The promotion of free trade plays an important role in the scholarly discussion concerning instruments of migration control. If one accepts the neo-classical theory, then, in the longer term, international migration will decrease as soon as trade controls are reduced, because the factor prices between emigration and immigration countries will converge gradually. This means that wages in the emigration and immigration countries will also converge, thus bringing migration to a halt. When a free exchange of goods takes place, then countries with low wage levels can offer

less-expensive and labour-intensive goods on international markets until the point where higher levels of demand cause the wage and price levels in these countries to gradually approach the international average. In the literature on migration theory, the European migration into the US is often used as a positive example: after the gap closed in the 1950s and 1960s between the income structure in Europe and the US, emigration from Europe to the USA declined sharply (Martin: 1997, 244).

Today, states are far away from the neo-classic ideal of the free exchange of goods. According to estimates made by the United Nations, the protectionism adhered to by the industrial nations cause an annual loss of revenues for the countries of the Third World amounting to 100 billion US dollars for agricultural goods and a further 50 billion US dollars for textiles. This loss of revenue amounts to approximately three times more than the sum of the development aid given worldwide in 1990, and makes up about 5 percent of the GDP in the developing countries (UN Conference on Trade and Development/IOM: 1996, 60). In fact, a policy of trade liberalisation is a focal point of the EU development aid policy, as seen through the Lomé Agreement or the Caribbean Basin Initiative. However, the Lomé Agreement includes a clause which states that the producing countries in Africa, in the Caribbean and the Pacific regions (the so-called ACP states) must buy their incoming goods either from the other states or the European Union. This means that they are sometimes not allowed to import the least expensive goods on the market (UN Conference on Trade and Development/IOM: 1996, 60). Moreover, the fall of commodity prices in the last decades has created more and more pressure to emigrate from the developing countries. When countries reacted to this fall of commodity prices with a diversification of exportable goods, they were then

confronted once again with tariff barriers in the importing countries. Although tariffs have sunk worldwide since the Uruguay Round, the duties on high-end products are still substantially higher than on raw materials. This holds true even for trade between most-favoured countries (UN Conference on Trade and Development/IOM: 1996, 61).

Although the results of our empirical studies are not explicit here, scholars are in agreement that a liberalisation of trade worldwide would bring about positive developmental effects in the developing countries (cf. Vogler: 2000, 93). Admittedly, the effects of trade liberalisation on migrational movements are also coupled with various other non-economic factors, such as political stability and guaranteeing a minimum of legal standards.

The most important trade liberalisation programmes took place in the 1990s in the context of strategies of regional integration. An example is the establishment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 and the bilateral Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement between the EU states and the southern Mediterranean states in 1995. The one-sided emigration from the less-developed countries in the south played important roles in the establishment of these treaties. An important component of these treaties is a more tightly knit economic cooperation, primarily through a liberalisation of trade and the facilitation of capital transfers.

The goal of the Association Agreement between the EU and the non-European Mediterranean states was the erection of a free trade zone; this free trade zone currently applies to industrial products only. The contracting parties supplementarily agreed on a cooperation to reduce pressure to migrate through the support of educational possibilities and the establishment of job creation programmes (Niessen; Mochel: 1999, 29). The agreement's restriction

to industrial products only had a negative effect for the Mediterranean states, however, because they had to ease their own import restrictions on industrial goods from the EU even though their export goods, predominantly agricultural products, continued to be met with strong import restrictions on the part of the EU. It is obvious, though, that such a one-sided restriction of trade relations cannot reduce migration pressure.

The NAFTA Agreement between Canada, the US and Mexico became effective in 1994. The agreement's goals are the elimination of tariff and non-monetary trade hindrances between the three states. The hopes placed on the reduction of the Mexican migration into the other North American countries did not materialise, because the Mexican economy was struck once again by economic crisis after an upswing phase in the mid-1990s. According to economists, the fact that the immigration of Mexicans remains constant at a high level is due to the disparity of income levels between Mexico on the one hand and the USA and Canada on the other. In addition, the high natural population growth in Mexico (2 percent per annum) contributes in a fundamental manner to the high emigration rates from Mexico, despite the implementation of strategies of regional commercial development in Mexico (Martin: 1997, 252f.).

It is clear that a liberalisation of trade requires flanking measures to actually bring about a reduction of migration. A notable example often mentioned here is the southern expansion of the European Union in the 1980s. Contrary to some prognoses, the expansion of the inner European freedom of movement triggered no considerable emigration from Greece, Spain and Portugal. Several reasons for this have been discussed: the relatively small disparity of income levels between the acceding countries and the

prosperous EC countries, the introduction of acceptable social security systems before accession and the heavy regional development support for the acceding countries from the EU. Finally, in contrast to Mexico, a considerable growth of population in the southern European countries no longer took place (Martin, *ibid.*).

### *Foreign direct investment*

Lately, foreign direct investment has been given an important role in the development of economies. According to neo-classic economic theory, capital flow from countries rich in capital to those with less capital leads to a gradual balancing of productivity and to corresponding effects on the labour market. In principle, however, foreign investments are transacted by private enterprises whose activities are determined by expectations on the rate of return of their investments; these protagonists do not intend to control migration here. Direct investment can indirectly cause the effects of a control of migration through job creation in potential emigration countries and through positive impulses created through an increase of demand in the economy as a whole. In turn, these impulses influence the level of employment in the potential emigration country. The possible transfer of technology also provides for growth effects which, in the longer term, provide for a higher level of employment. The fact is, however, that foreign direct investments transacted by European countries and Japan flow primarily into the more advanced developing countries (for example, Malaysia and Singapore); in the meantime, however, the roles of these advanced developing countries in migration movements have become more relative. Instead, these countries are experiencing a net



immigration (Martin: 1997, 248). It should be questioned how extensive the investments have to be in order to bring about noticeable effects on the labour markets of migration countries. Next to expectations on the rate of return, foreign direct investment is strongly dependent on political and infrastructural investment projects in the recipient countries.

During our empirical study, we received no reply to our questions concerning foreign investment projects aiming to reduce migration.

### *Reducing emigration through direct foreign aid*

The advantage of influencing migration policy through direct foreign aid is that the giving states can directly influence how these funds are to be used. Since the 1990s, development aid from the European giving countries has been tied to the compliance with minimum humanitarian standards (respect for human rights, democratisation) in the recipient countries. It may be possible to exert external influence on authoritarian systems, and thus to perhaps reduce politically motivated emigration. A control of migration through development aid presents a broad palette of indirect measures, including family planning measures, the support of small and medium-sized enterprises, vocational training and conversational or environmental sanitation measures. Nevertheless, an enormous transfer of development aid would be necessary to be actually able to control migrational movements.

The authors of the book, *Aid in Place of Migration?* (Böhning; Schloeter-Paredes: 1994) have taken an intensive look at the questions concerning which form of development aid is necessary to actually prevent economically

motivated migration and how high this funding would have to be. In their opinion, this funding would amount to enormous sums. For Central America, it has been estimated that approximately 100 US dollars per inhabitant and per annum would have to be invested for the next 20 to 30 years in order to remove the pressure to emigrate (Martin: 1994, 246). For eastern Europe, it is estimated that between 20 and 40 billion US dollars of development aid per annum would have to be rendered in order to create enough employment for the local populace (Martin: 1994, 246).

A further question is in which form development aid must be rendered, so that it is efficient in creating employment. Weintraub und Diaz-Briquets (1994) discuss the example of Central America, which received substantial US financial aid in the 1980s, most of which was military aid. According to the authors' calculations, the amount of development aid necessary in order to keep the levels of employment constant despite a growing population (between 350,000 and 500,000 new jobs per annum would be necessary) would not be much higher than the aid tendered in the 1980s to this region. But the donor countries, especially the US, lost strategic interest in the region after the end of the Cold War. Moreover, development aid was used counter-productively in too many recipient countries, especially when this aid went towards import substitution strategies through which lower quality and excessively expensive goods were produced for a cramped internal market from state-supported monopolies. Or, overvalued currencies impede the sale of local products on the international market, while making it easier for the elite to import luxury goods at relatively low prices (Martin: 1997, 256).

Development aid has seldom been used in regards to international migration movements. The support for the migration of returnees makes up a sizable exception here.

At present, this kind of development aid is the focus of a migration-oriented development aid policy, as the results of our empirical study show.

## **Conclusion**

The regulation of migration with the help of development aid policy was often discussed in the 1990s. Numerous publications and international meetings reflect the interest in this topic. However, the number of concrete projects concerned with development policy are relatively few. Here, the discrepancy between the (controversially discussed) theoretical approaches and the practical results is obvious.

Previous activities have concentrated on different forms of repatriation support for migrant workers and refugees, coupled with flanking development policy measures in the countries of origin. The practical efficiency of these measures, however, cannot lead to euphoria. Yet, the costs of a development-oriented repatriation support are high, and the number of migrants participating in these programmes are small. One can only speculate about the actual efficiency of these development aid measures in the countries of origin. In addition, a connection between development aid policy and political strategies pertaining to the regulation of migration is often ignored by many non-state carriers of development policy. It is often argued that development aid is solely humanitarian, and that it must therefore be based purely on the needs of the developing country, and not on the migration policies of giving countries. Finding possibilities for a compromise between subjects in development policy is at present a completely undefined field of study.

The most promising and cooperative approaches towards a migration-oriented development policy are not those where initiatives always emphasise the return of migrants or attempt to hinder new migration, but rather those where migrants' initiatives are funded with regards to development support. At present, examples of such can be seen in the Netherlands and in France where private migrants' development initiatives can expect governmental support.<sup>13</sup> The political agencies in recipient countries must also be more strongly tied into the conception of such development strategies. However, this kind of policy seems to result less in migration control, and more in a strengthening of the development competencies of transnational communities. Altogether, with the implementation of such programmes migration policy would set off in a completely new direction: the primacy of the politics of migration control, which most European conservatives continue to propagate, would then be pushed back by a 'softer' form of politics, one which realistically considers the interdependences between the countries of origin of immigrants and the immigration countries.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> For example, the opening remarks made by the then Danish Prime Minister Paul Rasmussen at the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen in 1995: "If you don't help the third world ... then you will have these poor people in our society". During the summit it became clear how much the orientation of development aid strategies had changed: the donor nations had come to the conclusion that it was better for development when investments were made in providing for basic human needs. This change was coupled with the realisation that a wider participation by the populace of the Third World nations in the process of development promised more

success than the decades-long international support of large infrastructure projects.

- <sup>2</sup> See Aumüller's chapter concerning the French policy of *codéveloppement* in this volume.
- <sup>3</sup> Interestingly, in the 1990s the German government implemented one of the most extensive programmes in the field of migration-oriented development aid policy. This has been the aid programme for diaspora Germans in the former Soviet Union. However, the German government has never used the term "development aid" in the context of this support programme. See also page 16 in this article and, furthermore, Thomas Schwarz' chapter in Volume 2.
- <sup>4</sup> An interesting paper has been published recently by Ninna-Nyberg-Sørensen, Nicholas van Hear and Poul Engberg-Pedersen (2002). Their analysis provides a very helpful overview of "current thinking and available evidence of the migration-development nexus" (Nyberg-Sørensen et al.: 2002, 5). It summarizes the research on the wide-spread single issues related to the migration-development nexus. However, only the English-language literature has been regarded whereas, for example, the very elaborated French discussion is excluded.
- <sup>5</sup> See Rossetos Fakiolas' article in this volume.
- <sup>6</sup> These statistics are based on estimates. The statistics for the former Soviet Union are based on the results of the census in 1989. It is assumed that in the past many ethnic Germans did not reveal their German descent due to fear that they would have been disadvantaged (Info-Dienst Deutsche Aussiedler, No. 100, April 1999, 10).
- <sup>7</sup> In the beginning of the 1990s, the German Isoplan Institute submitted an overview on support programmes for the reintegration of remigrants in 23 western European countries. The result was that out of these 23 countries, 12 countries had implemented practical programmes in this field (Werth: 1993).
- <sup>8</sup> See Aumüller's chapter in this volume.
- <sup>9</sup> The category "sans papier", unique to France, includes a broad spectrum of migrants. This spectrum includes applicants for asylum who have been refused this status, 'illegal' immigrants and victims of slave trade, among which the French government does not differentiate (Koser: 2001, 18).
- <sup>10</sup> See Aumüller in this volume.
- <sup>11</sup> See Aumüller's chapter on the French policy of *codéveloppement* in this volume.

- <sup>12</sup> Before the repatriation of Yugoslavian refugees was implemented, the EU countries already had some experience with supporting the repatriation of refugees. In 1980, Germany presented a programme for the remigration and reintegration of asylum seekers from Sri Lanka. In other cases, the countries of origin were offered financial compensation when they took back refused asylum seekers or illegal immigrants (for example, Albanians returning from Italy, Romanians returning from Germany and Czechs returning from Poland). In the Scandinavian countries repatriation programmes were developed for refugees from Chile. (Joly: 2001, 99ff.)
- <sup>13</sup> See Aumüller's chapter on the French policy of *codéveloppement* in this volume.

## References

- Adepoju, A.: 1998, Linking population policies to international migration in sub-Saharan Africa, in: Appleyard, R. (ed.), *Emigration Dynamics in Developing Countries*. Vol. 1: Sub-Saharan Africa. Aldershot (Ashgate), 301–337.
- Akder, Halis; Gitmez, Ali: 1981, Planungen zwischen Hoffnung und Sorge, in: *Zeitschrift für Kulturaustausch*, vol. 31, no. 3, 329–334.
- Ammassari, Savina; Black, Richard: 2001, *Harnessing the Potential of Migration and Return to Promote Development. Applying Concepts to West Africa*. IOM Migration Research Series, no. 5. Geneva (IOM).
- Balaj, Barbara: 2001, Albanische Diaspora. Rückkehr in den Kosovo: Segen oder Fluch für die Wirtschaft?, in: *Der Tagesspiegel*, 9.9.2001, Sonderbeilage "American Academy".
- Blaschke, Jochen: 1993, Findings from aid and co-operation programmes and their effects on migration: Measures taken and new prospects. Paper presented at the conference "Migration and International Co-operation: Challenges for OECD Countries", Madrid, 29–31 March 1993. Paris (OECD).
- Blaschke, Jochen: 1994, East-West migration in Europe and the role of international aid in reducing the need for emigration,

- in: Böhning, W.R.; Schloeter-Paredes, M.-L. (eds.), *Aid in place of migration?* Geneva (ILO), 73-100.
- BMZ (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung): 1999, Rückkehr- und Existenzgründungsprogrammeme für Fachkräfte aus Entwicklungsländern. Dokumentation, in: *Top - Berlin International*, No. 5, 79-91.
- BMZ (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung): 2000, *Medienhandbuch Entwicklungspolitik 2000*. Berlin.
- Böhning, W.R.; Schloeter-Paredes, M.-L.: 1994, *Aid in Place of Migration? Selected contributions to an ILO-UNHCR meeting*. Geneva (ILO).
- Collinson, Sarah; Edye, David: 1996, *Die Armut soll zu Hause bleiben*, in: *Der Überblick*, no. 4, 79-83.
- Fischer, Peter A.; Martin, Reiner; Straubhaar, Thomas: 1997, *Interdependencies between Development and Migration*, in: Hammar, T.; Brochmann, G.; Tamas, K.; Faist, T. (eds.), *International Migration, Immobility and Development. Multidisciplinary Perspective*. Oxford, New York, 91-132.
- Fumetti, Wolfgang von: 1999, *Hilfen für Spätaussiedler in den Herkunftsländern: Sinnvolle Zukunftsinvestitionen oder "Faß ohne Boden"?*, in: *Forschungsinstitut der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Abt. Arbeit und Sozialpolitik* (ed.), *Perspektiven der neuen Aussiedlerpolitik*. Bonn, 41-51.
- Hermele, Kenneth: 1997, *The Discourse on Migration and Development*, in: Hammar, T.; Brochmann, G.; Tamas, K.; Faist, T. (eds.), *International Migration, Immobility and Development. Multidisciplinary Perspective*. Oxford, New York, 133-158.
- IOM: 1997, *IOM Return Policy and Programmemes. A Contribution to Combatting Irregular Migration*. Dokument MC/INF/236, 5.11.1997.
- Joly, Danièle: 2001, *Temporärer Schutz für Flüchtlinge im Rahmen eines neuen europäischen Flüchtlingsregimes*, in: Blaschke, Jochen (ed.), *Ost-West-Migration. Perspektiven der Migrationspolitik in Europa*. Berlin, 79-120.
- Koser, Khalid: 2001, *The Return and Reintegration of Rejected Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants. An analysis of*

- government assisted return programmes in selected European countries. IOM Migration Research Series, no. 4. Geneva (IOM).
- Lepola, Outi: 2002, Inclusions and Exclusions. Some Observations about the Finnish Immigration Policy in the 1990s, in: *Migration – A European Journal of International Migration and Ethnic Relations*, no. 36/37/38, 177–192.
- Martin, Philip L.: 1994, Reducing emigration pressure: What role can foreign aid play?, in: Böhning, W.R.; Schloeter-Paredes, M.-L. (eds.), *Aid in place of migration?* Geneva (ILO), 241–253.
- Martin, Philip: 1997, Economic Instruments to Affect Countries of Origin, in: Münz, Rainer; Weiner, Myron (eds.), *Migrants, Refugees, and Foreign Policy. U.S. and German Policies towards Countries of Origin*. Providence/Oxford, 231–272.
- Modeen, Tore: 1999, Les Finnois d'Ingrie, in: *Europa Ethnica*, vol. 56, no. 3–4, 161–169.
- Niessen, Jan; Mochel, France: 1999, EU External Relations and International Migration. Brüssel (Migration Policy Group).
- Nyberg-Sørensen, Ninn; van Hear, Nicholas; Engberg-Pedersen, Poul: 2002, *The Migration-Development Nexus – Evidence and Policy Options*. IOM Migration Research Series No. 8. Geneva (IOM).
- Rogers, Rosemarie: 1997, Migration Return Policies and Countries of Origin, in: Hailbronner, K.; Martin, D.A.; Motomura, H. (eds.), *Immigration Admissions. The Search for Workable Policies in Germany and the United States*. Providence; Oxford, 147–204.
- Ronge, Volker: 1997, German Policies toward Ethnic German Minorities, in: Münz, Rainer; Weiner, Myron (eds.), *Migrants, Refugees, and Foreign Policy. U.S. and German Policies towards Countries of Origin*. Providence; Oxford, 117–140.
- Schiller, G.: 1994, Reducing emigration pressure in Turkey: Analysis and suggestions for external aid, in: Böhning, W.R.; Schloeter-Paredes, M.-L. (eds.), *Aid in Place of Migration?* Genf (ILO), 203–240.



- Schwarz, Thomas: 2001, Ost-West-Migration und Migrationsregulierung: Deutsche Diasporaimmigration aus den Nachfolgestaaten der Sowjetunion, in: Blaschke, Jochen (ed.), Ost-West-Migration. Perspektiven der Migrationspolitik in Europa. Berlin, 37-56.
- Virtanen, Timo: 1992, The Finn Ingrians as Return Migrants, in: Siirtolaisuus Migration, no. 3, 36-38.
- Vogler, Michael: 2000, Determinanten der Zuwanderung aus Entwicklungsländern. Baden-Baden (Nomos).
- Weintraub, Sidney; Diaz-Briquets, S.: 1994, The use of foreign aid for reducing incentives to emigrate from Central America, in: Böhning, W.R.; Schloeter-Paredes, M.-L. (eds.), Aid in place of migration? Geneva (ILO), 119-150.
- Werth, Manfred: 1981, Der Hoca macht in Anatolien auch Investitionspolitik, in: Zeitschrift für Kulturaustausch, vol. 31, no. 3, 322-329.
- Werth, Manfred: 1993, Reintegrationsmaßnahmen in Europa - Eine Bestandsaufnahme, in: Ausländer in Deutschland, vol. 9, no. 2, 7-9.

