

JUTTA AUMÜLLER

## **Migration Control through *Codéveloppement*?\***

### **The Debate over Regulating Immigration and Development Politics in France**

Since the outset of the 1990s, migration-oriented development aid policy has been discussed intensely. This debate has been conducted in the countries with high immigration rates under the premises that increased migrational movements worldwide cannot be brought under control solely through enforcement policies. In this sense, this debate is coupled with other debates in migration research. The debates over the “root causes” of migration and “early warning” methods, both of which were discussed in the research on refugees in the 1980s, serve as good examples here. Both debates were concerned with analyzing the triggering moments of refugee movements. In the first case, the goal was to develop comprehensive solutions for the elimination of the structural causes of forced migration. In the second case, it was to create an effective early warning system for the control of migration. In both cases, it was important to recognize flight and migration as complex systems that cannot be resolved by enforcement policy measures alone.

In the years following the Second World War, several hundred thousand migrant workers were recruited from

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\* translated by William Hiscott

both the peripheral countries of southern Europe and the 'Third World' for employment in the western European industrial nations. The social background of these immigrants did not interest anyone as long as there was an urgent demand for them in western European labour markets due to the booming post-war economies. Strangely, it was the closing of these labour markets for immigrants that resulted in questions about living conditions in their countries of origin. One had called for workers and they came; one became weary of them in times of recession, but they did not leave. They had their reasons for not leaving.

Today, to speak of a migration-oriented development aid policy (or of a development-oriented migration policy), means the following: the stimulation of improved living conditions in emigrants' countries of origin in order to avoid further immigration to Europe or, at least, in order to decrease the current levels of immigration. Such concepts appeared soon after the recruitment freeze in the European immigration countries during the second half of the 1970s. Since the rotation system utilized by the employment of foreign workers, which was preferred by many European countries, proved to be non-effective, programmes were established through which voluntary repatriation support for migrant workers was combined with aid for self-employment or new businesses in the respective countries of origin. Often, the idea here was to create jobs through the foundation of new businesses in the countries of origin of work immigrants, and that these jobs would then make future migration superfluous. Numerous programmes of this type were established in different European immigration countries; as we know today, the efficiency of these programs is low with regards to the stimulation of a comprehensive repatriation of foreign workers.<sup>1</sup>

The concept of limiting immigration through economic support measures received new attention after the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. The transformation of the economic and political systems in these countries required enormous financial support from the countries of the European Union. In addition, a mass immigration of persons seeking employment was expected after the opening of the transformation states' previously hermetically closed borders. Due to these expectations, discussion processes began in West European countries about providing financial aid for the transformation states with the goal of easing migration pressure in the economically ruined Eastern European countries. These discussion processes have led to varied results; the purpose of the contributions in this volume is to discuss these results.

The contribution at hand is concerned itself with a French variant of development aid policy. This policy is oriented towards checking and controlling immigration movements. In contrast to the different strategical variants in other European countries, the French strategy stands out because it provides for a comprehensive and explicit migration-oriented development aid policy. After the change of government in France in 1997, a new policy was initiated through the establishment of a Délégation Interministérielle au Co-développement et à la Gestion des Flux Migratoires (inter-ministry delegation for 'co-development' and management of migrants flows). Here, development processes in the countries of origin of immigrants were to be combined with the control of immigration movements. The then socialist government, led by Premier Lionel Jospin, appointed an interministerial representative who took on the coordination among the differ-

ent state agencies involved in development aid policy and the independent development aid organizations.

This chapter will show how the French *codéveloppement* strategy is closely connected to specific migration systems established primarily by African immigrants in France. For decades, migrants from several regions of West Africa have been actively promoting development projects in their countries of origin. The *codéveloppement* policy is based on these already established transnational networks and attempts to functionalize them for purposes of migration control. This policy has brought about an intense and obviously irreconcilable debate between supporters of migration-oriented development aid policy and its critics. This will be discussed here in detail. First the migration model created by West African immigrants in France shall be presented. Thereafter, the political concept of *codéveloppement* and the surrounding controversial debates will be examined. From a migration research standpoint, the central question seems to be whether the development-oriented migration model, created by West African immigrants in France, is a specific migration system that cannot be generalized; or whether this special form of migration, which includes development in the countries of origin, can be a model for a general development aid policy that is relevant to migration.

## **The history of West African immigration to France**

The history of African immigration to France is defined mainly by the recruitment of foreign workers in the decades after the Second World War. However, this history has its roots in France's colonial era. Migrants from the Maghreb states dominate among these African immi-

grants. The number of immigrants from the countries of sub-Saharan Africa has always remained small in comparison to immigrants from the Maghreb states.

The immigration of black Africans to France is a recent phenomenon in the French history of immigration. This immigrant group was recorded for the first time in the 1946 census. At that time, the number of immigrants from black African countries totalled 13,517. Despite increased immigration in the decades since 1946, the percentage of this immigrant group in France's foreign population continued to be relatively small. According to the 1982 census there were 134,000 foreigners of black African origin in France. In 1982, black Africans amounted to ca. 3 percent of the foreign population of France (Amar/Milza: 1990, 25).

The migration of black Africans to France is based on migration systems that were established during the French colonial supremacy in Africa. The first occurrences of immigration of black Africans began to take place at the beginning of the 20th century. During the two world wars, Senegalese and Sudanese infantrymen were recruited by the French army. After the wars, the majority of these combatants were repatriated, although a small number remained in France. These migrants were, however, single cases. Regular immigration of black Africans began after the independence of the French colonies at the outset of the 1960s. The pioneer migrants at this time were members the Soninké from the Senegal River Valley. Among the members of this ethnic group, whose population is spread over the region of the upper Senegal River in Mali, Senegal and Mauritania, there is a long tradition of migration, dating back to the pre-colonial period. Before colonization, the Soninké were involved in the trade of Arabian gum, but also in the slave trade. French colonizers recruited Soninké for work on the peanut plantations in the region of Sen-

egambia. Here, a first form of seasonal migration, determined by the production cycles of the village farming, was developed. During the dry seasons, the Soninké worked on the peanut plantations, only to return to their native villages during the fertile seasons to carry out the necessary fieldwork (Findley and Sow: 1998, 74). Due to the long dry seasons in this region (6 to 8 months per annum), the added incomes through such seasonal work became an indispensable component to household economies. Since the beginning of the last century, Soninké embarked in Marseille, signed on to work on French ships and gradually began to wander further to other French cities.

Until the 1950s, there was no emigration wave from the Senegal Valley to France, but there was a considerable acceleration of migration. The Soninké from the Senegal Valley developed into a group of pioneer migrants, and they initiated the building of migration networks. Amar and Milza note that, by the end of the 1980s, one in every two black African immigrants in France originally came from the Senegal Valley (Amar and Milza: 1990, 26). In the 1960s, the immigration of black Africans was favoured by a liberal migration regime in France. France had made agreements after decolonization with the former colonies of Mali, Mauritania and Senegal concerning free migration - without visa requirements or previously attained work permits (*ibid.*, 25). The French government, though, repeatedly limited this free migration between France and the former African colonies; it passed measures in 1974, 1981 and again at the outset of the 1990s that successively dismantled the possibilities of unrestricted entry. Since these imposed restrictions, African immigrants must present several documents for legal entry for work purposes and, among other things, provide a certified contract

of employment for a duration of at least three years with a French employer (Finley and Sow: 1998, 74).

The Soninké have become pioneers by building a specific migration system. Within this migrant group, this system is marked by a strict social hierarchy and a tight network. Characteristic for this migrant group was the high quota of returnees to their countries of origin (this changed somewhat after the immigration laws were restricted in France in 1974). This high quota is an indicator of a close connection between the societies in the countries of origin and migrants' communities in France. Typically, migration cycles can be seen in the biographies of individual migrants (almost exclusively men), in which phases of employment in family farming in their villages of origin alternated with phases of work emigration. These migration cycles were subject to strong control by village and family patriarchs. With the restriction of possibilities of legal entry into France, immigrants began to establish themselves there in a more permanent manner; the periods of residency in France gradually became longer and families from the places of origin were also brought to France.

Increasingly, other black African immigrant groups, such as those from the Ivory Coast and Cameroon, joined the Soninké in France. More often than not the Soninké possess a low degree of vocational training; they are foremost manual labourers and often work in poorly paid jobs. The number of Soninké who have entered the country illegally has been very high since immigration was restricted in 1974. According to official consular reports, 19,992 Malinese, 5,177 Mauritians and 19,188 Senegalese were said to be living in France in 1981. These official numbers, however, are considered to be far below the actual numbers. Since the majority of black African immigrants are illiterate and therefore may not be able to fill in the requested offi-

cial forms, and a large number do not have residency permits, it is probable that the official records are not accurate. Findley and Sow quote estimates from 1981 stating that, of the immigrants from the Senegal Valley in France, 75,000 were Malinese, 9,000 Mauritians and 77,000 Senegalese (Findley and Sow: 1998, 80). The most recent figures on black African immigration to France are presented in tables 1 and 2.

<b>Country of origin</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>
Countries of sub-Saharan Africa	212,398	114,020	98,378
Cameroon	20,436	9,679	10,757
Congo	36,186	18,871	17,315
Ivory Coast	20,453	9,402	11,051
Madagascar	10,172	4,097	6,075
Mali	36,091	22,750	13,341
Senegal	38,956	22,443	16,513

*Table 1: Immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa to France without pertaining French citizenship (1999)*

*Source: INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, Recensements généraux de la population)*

<b>Country of origin</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>
Countries of sub-Saharan Africa	136,26	68,160	68,100
Cameroon	12,295	5,724	6,571
Congo	13,180	6,929	6,251
Ivory Coast	11,798	5,992	5,806
Madagascar	18,726	7,998	10,728
Mali	9,961	5,342	4,619
Senegal	20,345	11,614	8,731

*Table 2: Immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa to France pertaining French citizenship (1999)*

*Source: INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, Recensements généraux de la population)*

## **The emergence of black African immigrants' associations in France**

From an early stage immigrants in France from the Sahel and Maghreb states began to provide informal development aid for their villages of origin. In particular those from the Sahel countries (Mali, Mauritania and Senegal) participated in such activities. Beginning with the active recruiting of these immigrant workers in the 1960s, the idea of their temporary residency in France was prevalent. They were generally low-skilled; the majority were employed as semi-skilled workers in French industry. As a rule, single men were those who migrated to France; they wanted to earn money in order to support their families in Africa. As in other Western European immigration countries, the reunification of families in France became prevalent only after the recruitment freeze for migrant workers was implemented there in 1974. Regarding West

African immigrants, the reunification of families played a minor role in their immigrant communities in comparison to other such communities in France. This was also the case after 1974.

African migrants in France quickly organized themselves on the basis of common villages of origin. They did so in order to aid each other in providing for basic needs in the country of immigration (housing, food, work, social contact, etc.). Solidarity within the local immigrant group also played an important role in these organizing efforts. This solidarity manifested itself in common pools of funds, into which all provided a contribution. These pools of funds allowed for common kitchens in the communities and for the development of social security for the families in the villages of origin. Such pools of funds are traditionally a component of the local communities in the countries of origin, and they were at first administered on a patriarchal basis. Hamédy Diarra, Programme Director of the Réseau des Associations de Développement de la Vallée du Fleuve Sénégal (Network of Associations for the Development of the Senegal Valley; RADVFS), analyzed the functional change of these pools of funds in the course of the recent migration and has come to the conclusion that such pools of funds did not work in all cases. However, they made an important and positive contribution to the later organizational changes within the immigrant associations (Diarra: 1998, 74).

In the 1970s, a certain percentage of African immigrants began to participate in social and political movements in France. Such movements were concerned with the fight against the miserable housing for immigrants, for legal equality and for workers' rights. After the French government halted the official recruitment policy of foreign workers in 1974, they also began to fight for the legaliza-

tion of residency statuses of illegal immigrants. During this time, immigrants could also have their then unofficial associations officially recognized by French law. This caused organizational and functional changes in the immigrant associations; the generation of patriarchs began to be replaced by a new generation of modern functionaries. The organization of a permanent residency in the country of immigration also became more and more urgent, as the conditions determining legal residency became more restrictive in France. The "myth of return" continued to exist, but the pragmatic aspect of first earning sufficient money to be able to return to the country of origin superceded all other goals. Under these circumstances, the relationship between immigrants and their countries of origin had to be reconsidered. The miserable living conditions in the villages of origin remained obvious, but the way in which the migrants positioned themselves to these conditions changed; they no longer saw them as inalterable.

African migrants increasingly began to initiate projects for the development of village infrastructures in their countries of origin. At first, these projects did not follow any development concepts, but were oriented towards relieving obvious problems in the villages of origin. Access to schools, roads, electricity, clean water, sewage systems and public health utilities were lacking almost everywhere in rural regions. Within the immigrants' associations, which were still organized according to village of origin, single construction projects were decided upon through arrangements made with the families in the villages of origin. Over the last twenty years, more comprehensive projects have grown out of these initiatives. The actual implementation of these projects usually stands under the direct supervision of representatives or emissaries from the migrants' associations, who, in this manner, bring their

abilities acquired in the Diaspora back to their village community. At first, these projects were completely financed from the migrants' common pools of funds. This continues to be the predominant source of funds for such projects today (Diarra: 1998, 77).

The first publications on development projects initiated by migrants in Mali, were published in the 1980s. At this time, social scientists were particularly interested in the originality of this form of support for the villages of origin, as well as in the special migration element through which this support took place. In regards to Mali, it was estimated that the transfer of funds of work migrants flowing back to the country in 1982 corresponded to approximately one-eighth of Mali's GDP. The majority of these transfers was directed to irrigation projects in the Kayes region (Gonin: 2001).

The Panos Institute in France has studied African migrants' associations over a longer period of time. At the outset of the 1990s, the institute made a first attempt to quantify the extent of the activities of such associations. It determined that there were ca. 400 such organisations in France at the time, and it carried out interviews with a quarter of these. The institute also visited 98 places of origin from which members of these associations emigrated. On the basis of the interviews, the Panos Institute noted that four out of five migrants from the Senegal Valley were members of migrants' associations. Altogether, the 105 associations that were interviewed had carried out 346 projects in the places of origin. These were classified in the study as follows:

Cultural Projects (construction of Mosques and Madrasahs)	11.8%
Agricultural Projects	6.9%
Health Care	20.2%
Establishment of Schools	15.9%
Foundation of Consumer Groups	17.9%
Clean Water Projects	16.4%
Support of Co-operatives	6.0%
Service Projects (especially development of local post offices in Senegal)	4.6%

(Source: Gonin: 2001).

The following table also shows the breadth of projects both carried out and in planning. The projects listed below are those that were carried out up until the mid-1990s in the Yélimané region in Mali under the direction of work emigrants in France.

<b>Projects</b>	<b>Completed</b>	<b>In Imple- mentation</b>	<b>In Plan- ning</b>
Hospitals	11	1	10
Maternity Wards	9	0	3
Apartments	45	4	7
Apothecaries	12	2	8
Walk-in Clinics	2	0	0
Wells	180	12	11
Water Towers	5	0	4
Elementary Schools	70	6	24
Madrasahs	14	1	1
Consumer Co-operatives	20	2	0

Mosques	43	2	2
Water Pipes	1	1	0
Libraries	1	0	1
Telecommunications	1	0	0
Water Dams	7	2	4
Number of Members	8,888		

*Table 3: Projects in the Yélimané Region in Mali financed by emigrants in France*

*Source: Commission des Associations Maliennes en France, Contribution des Associations maliennes en France à la Table-ronde, Paris, January 1997; Gonin: 2001.*

In a report written in the late 1990s for the French Ministry of Labour by the social scientists Bliion and Verrière, it was determined on the basis of quantitative interviews that more than one-third of the Malinese and Senegalese immigrants living in France were paying members of the Association Villageoise. Another 10 percent were members of the Association Inter-Villageoise, a regionally-based organization made up of immigrants from several neighbouring villages of origin. Furthermore, more than 80 percent of the interviewed immigrants from Mali and Senegal indicated that they regularly send financial transfers to members of their families in their native villages (Bliion: 2000, 108).

In the scholarly literature, migrants' associations involved in development aid politics are identified as OSIIM (Organisations de Solidarité Internationale issues de l'Immigration). The social scientist Christophe Daum defines OSIIM to be "associations à but non lucratif constituées par des personnes issues de l'immigration et ayant

tout ou partie de leurs activités tournées vers la solidarité internationale avec le pays d'origine" ( non-profit organisations made up of persons with an immigration background who direct their activities in whole or in part towards international solidarity with the country of origin) (Blion: 2000, 109). In a survey by the Panos Institute published in the beginning of 2000, approximately 1,000 such associations were counted in France (Daum: 2000; cited in Blion: 2000). One-third of these organizations were founded by immigrants from the Senegal Valley; another third from immigrants from other Sub-Saharan countries. A significant percentage of associations were founded by immigrants from Madagascar, Comoros and the three Maghreb states.

An increased formalization of migrants' associations and their activities has occurred in the course of their development. Complex networks have arisen from loose organizations based on villages of origin, and some have received public attention. One of these associations is the aforementioned RADVFS, which is active in France, Senegal, Mali and Mauritania. Associations of immigrants from the Kayes region in Mali, a region where development has been neglected over decades by the Malinese state, are strongly involved in RADVFS. This network's most important concern is the social and cultural development in the migrants' countries of origins. Accordingly, RADVFS has initiated and implemented numerous projects in the education and health services fields.

Another prominent organization Migration et Développement was founded in 1986. Unionised Moroccan immigrants in France, who had either ascended socially and economically through vocational training, or wanted to become increasingly involved in development projects for their villages of origin towards the end of their working

lives were the driving force behind the foundation (Conversation with the chairman of the organization, Ali Amahan, in the magazine *Hommes et Migration*, no. 1206, March-April 1997, 108-110). The projects supported by Migration et Développement primarily cover measures aiding in the supply of electricity and clean water, as well as in the development of telecommunication facilities. Furthermore, an important concern of this organization is the development of structures pertaining to civil society in the countries of origin. The idea of self-responsibility serves as an impetus for the organization; this idea is also valued as an important factor in the organization's self-conception. Accordingly, the organization works towards developing a sensibility in the village populations for the concept that modernization measures should not be passively expected from the state, but rather that development can be taken into their own hands. This work is coupled with the development of local participatory structures. It is also an organizational goal to slow the rural exodus occurring due to both internal migration from rural to urban areas and emigration.

With their work, these associations do not merely strive towards achieving material goals. The improvements of infrastructure in the villages of origin go hand in hand with the enhancement of social, cultural and political competency among the village populations. In this regard, local development aid of this sort should contribute to social change, which may then help to change the political structures in the countries of origin themselves.

The successes of these migrants' initiatives have been considerable. The Kayes region in Mali is frequently mentioned as a region positive accomplishments, in an area in which there had been no state development programmes since the 1960s. In the beginning of the 1970s, this region

had the highest illiteracy rate in Mali. In the 1990s, however, most larger villages had primary schools thanks to the initiatives of migrants. The literacy rate in the Kayes region had reached the average in Mali in the 1990s, and it lies above the average literacy rate in the rural regions of Mali as a whole. The number of village health facilities has also increased notably. For example, an average of five health facilities existed in each administrative district (*arrondissement*) in the Kayes region in the 1990s, and more have been developed in the meantime. Twenty years earlier, health facilities had generally only existed in the administrative districts' capitals. The average provision area of these facilities has sunk to a radius of 15 kilometres. The electrification of the villages has also been greatly improved due to the engagement of accordingly trained migrants (Diarra: 1998, 78).

In the meantime, the development activities of the migrants' associations have also been the focus of criticism. Objections have been raised about this form of informal development aid to the extent that these activities are not integrated into any defined concept of development; for example, irrigation systems have been developed along the Senegal River that have allowed for an extensive production of fruit and vegetables without there being adequate marketing possibilities in the region due to a lack of roads. The economic cost-effectiveness of such measures has been questioned. Migrants working on the projects have also been criticized for lacking professionalism; they have been referred to as autodidacts who do not possess a general overview of development. Furthermore, in the 1990s, the development activities of migrants often failed to gain the attention and acceptance of the intellectual class in their countries of origin (Diarra: 1998, 79f.).

Despite to these objections, societal changes have nevertheless been triggered by the development-related engagement of migrants. Altogether, it has been possible to change the backward image of the rural regions in these West African countries through such development impulses. One result of these changes is that qualified occupational groups have gradually become more willing to work outside of urban areas: For example, doctors, engineers and technicians are increasingly prepared to live and work in the newly built health facilities or in technical projects in the countryside. These societal changes have also caused the national bank systems to adapt themselves more strongly to handling the transnational transactions necessary for the private funding of development projects. Simplified banking methods were established in order to serve this special type of client. In the meantime, Malinese, Senegalese and Mauritanian banks have opened branch offices in France for the transfer of funds from migrants to their countries of origin. Increasingly, migrants' associations and projects are no longer restricted to single villages. These *associations intervillageoises* (inter-village associations) often extend over whole administration districts or historical regions (Diarra: 1998, 80).

Characteristic of migrants' associations active in development politics is the plurality of organizational forms and projects. In some instances, common projects have been developed through associations of immigrants stemming from the same place of origin but living in different immigration countries. However, the financial support provided for individual projects remains rather modest. The average budget that the individual associations have for the support of projects is estimated to be 100,000 FF per annum (Daum: 2000, cited from Blion: 2000, 110). Only a few of these associations in France have been able to in-

crease their funding through public funds. When these are provided for, they come most often from French regional administrative bodies (*collectivités territoriales*) and rarely from the national department of development aid (Blion: 2000, 110). Around 20 percent of the associations portrayed in the aforementioned study received public funds for their projects and activities; in these cases, the funds received averaged 50,000 FF per annum (Daum: 2000; cited from Blion: 2000, 110). The possibility of receiving public funds for projects depends on the degree of organization and professionalism put forth by the associations applying for funds. It is clear that information over the possibilities regarding public funding has not yet reached many of these associations.

### ***Codéveloppement* as means of inclusion of immigrants in public development aid policy**

With the change of government in France in 1997, a new policy was initialized with the founding of a Délégation Interministérielle au Co-développement et à la Gestion des Flux Migratoires. The intent behind the founding of this institution was to couple the processes of development in immigrants' countries of origin with a control of migrational movements. This strategy of *codéveloppement* is centred primarily on the informal development aid activities, which had been previously initiated and carried out by immigrants in their villages of origin. With the founding of this interministerial delegation, state agencies were to take up this form of informal and local aid, and transfer these impulses into consequential regional development in the countries of origin.

As a conceptional basis for *codéveloppement*, political scientists developed a report entitled *Rapport de bilan et d'orientation sur la politique de codéveloppement liée aux flux migratoires* (Report on the outcomes and tendencies of the *codéveloppement* policy related to migration flows). With Sami Naïr, a professor of political science in Paris, the French premier appointed an interministerial representative for *codéveloppement*, whose task was the co-ordination of a common migration-oriented development aid policy among the different governmental and non-governmental development agencies and associations.

In an essay for the magazine, *Hommes et Migrations*, Naïr explains that the macro-economic instruments of development aid policy have proven unsuitable in effectively removing the causes of emigration in the countries of origin (Naïr: 1998). More fruitful seems to be a concentration on micro-economic instruments by favouring a decentralized development aid policy. Naïr cites the migrants themselves as the most important political actors in the *codéveloppement* strategy; thus, in order to relieve the causes for migration, the qualification and financial resources acquired through migration should be mobilized and integrated into regional development concepts in the countries of origin. Naïr emphasizes that this does not include the forced repatriation of migrants against their will. Rather, the integration of legal immigrants already living in France forms an important prerequisite for the success of *codéveloppement*.

In his essay, Naïr justifies the necessity of both migration control and the elimination of the causes of migration by stating that developing countries are not only facing the emigration of unskilled workers, but also increasingly the emigration of the countries' so-called intermediary classes. According to Naïr, emigrants from the intermediary classes

are composed of white-collar employees, entrepreneurs in the small business sector, artists, students and academics. These social groups are those that could be important carriers of impulses for development. This emigration threatens to become a new form of "looting" (Nair: 1998, 51). Nair pleads for a *codéveloppement* strategy in combination with suitable concepts for immigration control in France; immigration control does not mean, though, that strict quotas should be fixed. Nair refers rather to a policy of allocation (*ibid.*), distinguishing allocation from the fixing of quotas, the latter being the restriction of immigration to such groups of persons who are of immediate use for the countries of immigration. Allocation suggests instead, according to the concept of *codéveloppement*, that immigration for educational and vocational training purposes should be promoted, the goals being the repatriation of qualified persons to the countries of origin and the utilization of these migrants in projects relevant to development. Nair emphasizes that the policy of *codéveloppement* neither can nor wants to take over the task of controlling migration in general, but rather that migration control must be seen primarily from a perspective of mutual interest between the countries of origin and the immigration countries (Nair: 1998, 52).

The official document for such a policy was published in December of 1997 with the title, *Rapport de bilan et d'orientation sur la politique de codéveloppement liée aux flux migratoires* (Report on the outcomes and tendencies of the *codéveloppement* policy related to migration flows).<sup>2</sup> In this report the continued lack of integration of immigrants living in France is stressed. The inclusion of immigrants in projects relevant to development aid politics is seen as a possibility for increasing both the status and level of integration of immigrants in French society. Bilateral contracts

with the individual countries of origin of immigrants are to form the basis for the policy, and potential migrants from these countries are to be included in 'organized mobility'. This mobility is to be institutionalized in order to provide for the legal possibility of residing temporarily in France – either once or repeatedly – for employment purposes. The employment should be combined with vocational training measures. The French government also seeks to utilize this concept in order to reduce undocumented immigration to France by implementing a form of temporary migration that can be controlled.

According to this concept, various actors are to be included in the *codéveloppement* policy aside from state actors. They include:

- regional administrative bodies, which are to independently sign bilateral agreements with single regions in the emigration countries;
- NGOs and migrants' associations;
- small business and professional organizations. Here, special emphasis was placed on the promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises. Only through the networking of these businesses can the "destructive consequences" of structural adjustment policies be compensated for in the countries of origin. Moreover, it is said that it is important to stimulate the founding of a multitude of small businesses and to promote a general business culture in the countries of origin.

The report suggests first signing bilateral *codéveloppement* agreements with those countries of origin with which France has special relations as Francophone countries (Mali, Senegal, Mauritania and the Maghreb states). In a second stage, these agreements could be expanded to

include countries such as Turkey, Romania and some Asian states.

In the report, a measure noted to be worthy of support is the provision of funding for repatriation support for migrants who return to their countries of origin. The concept of *codéveloppement* differs here from the traditional form of repatriation support through the allocation of a larger amount of financial aid given to returnees and also through the stronger emphasis placed on providing for accompanying measures next to repatriation support. Projects initiated and carried out by migrants' associations should be given preference in regard to funding. For measures intended to provide for vocational training, the report suggests residency periods in France for a duration of 9 to 18 months. During this time, the participants are to be gainfully employed in opportunities through which they can expand their vocational skills. Furthermore, the savings of those migrants legally residing in France are to be used for investment purposes in their countries of origin.

Another informative document is a circular published at the end of 1998 by the Ministry of the Interior for the prefects of the federal administrative regions in France. This document concerns the implementation of the decentralized *codéveloppement* policy, and it focuses on three primary objectives:<sup>3</sup>

- The support of legal immigrants in France in their roles as carriers of development activities in their countries of origin. This support is to be provided for through aid for suitable projects carried out by single persons or associations in the countries of origin.
- "Stabilization" of the population in regions with strong emigration. The creation of employment opportunities in the regions of origin is denoted by the term "stabi-

lization". These employment opportunities are to reduce unregulated emigration out of these regions. The creation of such opportunities is to be accomplished through supporting regional development projects, of which possible carriers can be the French regional administrative bodies, businesses and enterprises, as well as associations and educational institutions.

- The organization of temporary opportunities for immigration of potential migrant populations in order to prevent lasting settlement in France. This is aimed towards offering temporary training measures for young people in France who have migrated from traditional emigration countries. Examples are young workers who would otherwise immigrate illegally to France, or students who receive an education in France in order to attain usable qualifications for their countries of origin.

According to a letter from the Ministry of the Interior, measures in the aforementioned context should be carried out independently by the regions and départements in a decentralized manner. In this way, projects can be conceptualized that would be carried out in co-operation with the immigrants' associations and focusing on the situation and needs in the countries of origin. The prefects of the départements are asked in the letter to name a negotiator for the interministerial representative in every département.

As the Ministry of the Interior further states in the letter, bilateral agreements regarding *codéveloppement* should be coupled with an agreement already in existence, namely the Contrat de Réinsertion dans le Pays d'origine (contract of reinsertion in the country of origin), which focuses on the reintegration of illegal immigrants and returnees in the countries of origin. This Contrat de Réinsertion was adopted in November 1998, and it covers immigrants from

Mali, Morocco and Senegal in France who have no regular residency permits. Through this agreement support for migrants who agree to a voluntary return is to be provided for through vocational qualifying measures and reintegration support. This programme for voluntary returnees is being carried out by the IOM.

A first agreement containing a common strategy of *codéveloppement* and migration control, namely the Convention de Codéveloppement Sénégalaise-Franco, was signed by the governments of France and Senegal in May 2000. This agreement was preceded by a common declaration signed by both governments in December 1998.<sup>4</sup> In this agreement, the following common goals were declared:

- The mobilization of Senegalese immigrants residing in France for the development of their country of origin through their vocational skills and savings. This is to be implemented by means of public support for the foundation of new enterprises and businesses, for the development of villages and for vocational training and education. It is made clear that, in the context of the agreement, such support is not tied to a permanent repatriation of migrants to Senegal. Also, according to the agreement, immigrants with regular residency permits in France, who decide to work on measures relevant to development in their country of origin, are to retain their residency permits and their claims on social security in France.
- Controlled mobility for educational and vocational training purposes is specifically noted in this agreement. Young Senegalese who have completed an education or studies in France, are to receive support for their professional or vocational integration in Senegal.
- The two governments agree on a common policy re-

garding the prevention of illegal migration. Senegalese without legal residency permits in France, who are obliged to leave France, can also participate in vocational training measures and receive support for repatriation.

Independent of bilateral agreements in the context of *codéveloppement*, the French government established a programme for local development in the countries of origin of migrants (Programme de Développement Local, PDML). This programme was launched in 1995 through a co-operation between the Ministry for Development Cooperation and Francophony, the French Ministry of Labour and the IOM. Its goal was to combine village development in the areas of origin of migrants with project support for returnees. Returning migrants, who wanted to create an independent enterprise in their native country received up to 24,000 FF in project support from the French government. To support the programme, the French government set up committees in the West African capitals of Dakar, Bamako and Nouakchott, where the regional IOM administrations, NGOs and local administrations are represented. According to the programme director in the French Ministry of Labour, the initial phase of the programme experienced great difficulties finding suitable partners in the countries of origin (Martin: 1998). These initial difficulties then gave way to a broad wave of newly founded businesses and enterprises. Between 1995 and the beginning of 1998, around 250 small businesses – predominantly in Mali, but also in Senegal and Mauritania – were founded on the basis of the PDML programme (Nédélec: 1998, 93). Informal information during our research points out, however, that the long-term efficiency of this programme has not been high. In a letter to the author of this article in January of 2002,

Reynald Blion of the Panos Institute stated that only three of the 23 small businesses founded by returnees to Senegal in the context of the PDML programme by the summer of 1998 still existed two years later. These meagre results fit in with the sobering results that the different repatriation programmes in the Western European immigration states have produced (cf. Rogers: 1997).

Currently, *codéveloppement* is still primarily a policy of intent. The concept is only gradually being converted into practice through bilateral negotiations. An evaluation of the concept, which would also look at the concrete measures that have been realised, has not yet been published. The French government's efforts regarding a migration-oriented development aid policy, however, have not found popularity among the aforementioned immigrants' associations and French NGOs. On the contrary, there is much distrust of the engagement of the French state. Almost all non-governmental actors reject the idea of coupling development aid with migration control policies (which would amount to a reduction of immigration). This dispute is often carried out by means of ideological arguments, but also with scholarly corroboration. Two French migration magazines, *Hommes et Migration* and *Migrations Société*, function as forums for the sometimes intense exchange of arguments between proponents and opponents of a state-run *codéveloppement* strategy. The debate is marked by fundamentally opposing attitudes regarding the question of repatriation.

Migrants' associations in France flatly reject the idea of carrying out development aid policy under the premise of migration control. Their main focal point is to support a concept of development that is oriented towards the economic and social reality in the villages of origin. This forms a contrary movement to the guiding principles of

state-run development aid policy. These actors couple their engagement for development directly with an ascent of their social status in the country of immigration. In the Diaspora they have gained knowledge of new forms of social organization, attained new qualifications and are now well-acquainted with two worlds. They want to contribute their expanded knowledge and experiences to the development of their countries of origin. They also expect to be appreciated for their competence and their engagement in the country of immigration. Migrants' associations and French NGOs concerned with development projects have involved themselves in the debate over *codéveloppement*, and they propagate demands of their own. These demands are primarily aimed at normalizing the residency status of illegal migrants. NGOs argue that it is necessary to combat all forms of exclusion and xenophobia, and to work with immigrants active in development projects, in order to move towards a greater equality between the impoverished and prosperous countries. To appreciate migrants as actors in development politics, it is necessary to stabilize their residency in the countries of immigration, which is the first step in providing for an acceptable basis for action (Oliveira de Sousa: 1999, 96). In this regard, demands are made towards a more flexible immigration policy. In order to achieve positive impulses from immigration for development in the countries of origin, legal possibilities for commuting should be created. To be able to reside legally for a longer period in the country of origin from time to time, without losing the possibility of a renewed entry into the country of immigration, would lead to stable and beneficial relationships for transnational development in the countries of origin (Oliveira de Sousa: 1999, 97).

A further critique stemming from this debate concerns, whether it makes any sense to combine development

policy with the goal of controlling migration. The French migration researcher Christophe Daum, who intensely studied the transnational networks of Malinese migrants in the 1990s, formulates this critique in an exemplary manner. Daum calls the theoretical premises, through which the state conceives the *codéveloppement* strategies, to be unfounded (Daum: 1988). The argument that the stabilization of the population (or migration control) is a necessary prerequisite for development in underdeveloped countries, an argument frequently expressed by politicians, can be met with exactly the opposite argument: that emigration is necessary in order to create possibilities for income in foreign countries and to allow for a transfer of ideas, skills and cultural values (Daum: 1998, 61f.). The volume of money transfers that immigrants in France send to their countries of origin is estimated to be 5 billion US dollars per annum. The amount of state development aid expenditure in France totals around 7 billion US dollars (Blion: s.a., 4). If one compares these numbers it becomes clear that the incomes produced through emigration cannot be compensated for by an increased development aid by the state.

The debate about how the emigration of migrant workers out of the underdeveloped regions of origin is to be judged in the context of development theory must be broadened by a sociological perspective of migration. How emigration in the examined West African states is tied to the seasonal cycle of production and the economic needs of the villages of origin, for example, has already been discussed in this essay. Push factors alone are not decisive in causing work emigration; in the case of West African migrant workers, social networks aid the decision to migrate. Young men of the Senegal Valley are expected to contribute to the livelihood of their family and their village community through migration. Migration is, therefore,

already included in their future plans for employment. In addition, the expectations regarding migration and its costs are precisely calculable given the experiences in already existing migrants' communities. Within the last few decades, complex migration systems have firmly established themselves in these societies. The question here is, then, whether a state-controlled policy that aims at practically holding a population inside its country of origin is at all capable of intervening in existing networks of migration in order to restructure these according to their own of migration policy (cf. Daum: 1998).

Another further critique by opponents of *codéveloppement*, which is frequently addressed towards the government, is that it often welcomes immigrants' initiatives, but actually offers these initiatives little material support. According to this critique, migrants' associations do not have sufficient access to state co-financing, and they are not adequately represented in the decision-making bodies regarding state development aid policy (Daum: 1998, 70; Diarra: 1998, 82). It has already been noted that individual projects financed by the immigrants' associations have a rather low volume of funds, and that access that these associations have to public funding is restricted. Competition in the acquisition of public funds is intense, and migrants' associations are at a disadvantage regarding local NGOs also competing for funding. The governmental decision-making bodies frequently criticize the projects of the immigrants' associations to the extent that these are most often investments in infrastructure projects and seldom investments in private or co-operative businesses. Less than 10 percent of the funds invested by migrants goes towards the foundation of new businesses. Rather, for the *migrants-développeurs*, the common use of their initiated projects is of most importance. The foundation of new businesses

would be perhaps more suitable for creating permanent employment opportunities in the places of origin, but there would then be larger conflicts regarding the distribution of funds, which could disrupt the community of investors.

Migrants' associations are frequently reproached for inefficiency and for lacking the know-how necessary for the implementation of projects. Established NGOs in the country of immigration attempt to engage themselves as mediators in the process of procuring funds and in the implementation of projects. Migrants' associations, which decline this form of co-operation, take the risk of being passed over in the procurement process. Indeed, the problem remains of how these associations can acquire competence and efficiency without losing their ability to choose the form of projects that they support on their own.

The West African migration system can be described as efficient and successful from the viewpoints of the migrants' communities and the societies of origin involved in the system. However, its form is subject to permanent change. For example, the migration regions, towards which Malinese and Sengalese oriented themselves up until the 1990s, were France (Malinese), Italy (Sengalese), Mauritania and the Ivory Coast. In the meantime, though, this orientation has been diversified; new regions of migration, such as the Arabian countries and Central and South African states, have come into focus. On a reduced scale, the Southern European countries remain attractive for migration. However, the catalogue of possible regions for migration is now larger, a special preference of West African migrants being the US. It is doubtful whether a policy of development support which attempts to subdue the dynamics of these migration systems through state-driven control of migration, can develop the necessary flexibility to react to the motivational powers driving such changes.

Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the development of infrastructure supported by migrants is at all suitable for reducing future pressure to migrate, or whether instead it creates new conditions in which a dependence on migrant incomes is continued. For example, irrigation systems in the Senegal Valley made possible through remittances were built, but the subsequent development of regional markets for the sales of the surplus production won through the irrigation systems limps behind the infrastructural improvements. The farms in the region have joined in irrigation co-operatives, but most of the family-run farms still rely on income through money transfers from migrant workers in order to provide for the membership dues required by the co-operatives (Findley/Sow: 1998, p. 72).

The achievements of the West African immigrants in France with regards to their development politics have been utilized by several different actors: by the local populations in Mali, Senegal and Mauritania, by the French state and increasingly also by the local NGOs – who attach themselves to these achievements, and who often try to improve their profile and increase their public funding. It must be feared that the *migrants-développeurs* will be quite low on the list of winners in spite of the originality of their activities and their personal financial efforts. It must also be feared that they are neither recognised as actors in development aid policy, nor are they going to experience any improvement of status in their country of immigration.

### ***Codéveloppement* as a strategy for an EU development aid policy?**

Immigrants' associations are not only active in development projects in France. Immigrants have joined together

to carry out projects that are relevant to development in their countries of origin in other European countries as well. Characteristic of these immigrants' associations are their different forms of organisation, as well as their different priorities regarding the selection of projects. Apart from the associations that carry out concrete projects in the regions of origin, there are those that take on the task of building networks between the countries of origin and immigration. Included in these are, for example, the organizations EMCEMO in the Netherlands and AID in Great Britain. EMCEMO (Euro-Mediterranean Migration and Development Centre) is made up of Maghreb immigrants. This organization's main areas of focus concern both the relationships between migration and development and the participation of migrants in the process of development. Regarding project work, EMCEMO co-operates with other NGOs involved in development aid. In particular, EMCEMO supports projects involved with the building of networks among self-help organisations in northern Morocco (Menehbi: 2000, 64). The British association, Alternative for India Development (AID), was founded in 1992, is involved in Asia and works with Asian communities in Great Britain. At the outset of its work, the emphasis was placed on forming relationships between immigrant communities in Great Britain and the marginalised population in Asia. Main areas of focus are the fight against child labour, the situation of women and the possibilities of political participation on a local basis. The second and third generations of immigrants in Great Britain are important target groups for this organization. These, to some extent, have a negative picture of their countries of origin; this organization concerns itself with changing these attitudes (Thiara: 2000, 62). As with many migrants' associations in France, AID fights against the fact that project work is

frequently seen as providing for repatriation support from the state. Other immigrants' associations support the exchange of young people between the countries of the north and those of the south.

Activities relevant to development politics, which are initiated and implemented by immigrants, take place in numerous other Western European immigration countries. It is necessary to bring these activities to the attention of the public, which could also support the process of the integration of migrants as a whole.

Through France's initiative, this model of a migration-oriented development aid policy has repeatedly been a topic of discussion within the European Union. Due to this initiative, a working group on asylum and migration was established by the EU, with the goal of drawing up plans of action for a *codéveloppement* strategy in several co-operating countries. These countries are Morocco, Albania, the Mediterranean states, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Somalia and Iraq (Migration News, March 2001, vol. 8, no. 3).

Strategies of *codéveloppement* are also being discussed in the context of EU-Mediterranean politics. In September 2000, the socialist parties brought forward a manifest for new European-Mediterranean politics. The following was suggested in the manifest with regard to a future migration politics in the European Parliament:

rationalising the movement of persons between the two shores on the basis of a sound, liberal visa policy; encouraging a genuine effective shared development strategy linked to migratory flows and involving the right of integration for immigrants legally settled in the host country; developing a public policy to aid their economic and social plans in their respective countries; and setting up institutions which direct their savings towards productive investment.<sup>5</sup>

With this manifest, the socialist fraction in the European Parliament has reacted to the European policy on the Mediterranean in the 1990s, which was determined by crisis scenarios involving a threatening mass exodus as long as measures for creating incomes were not implemented in the Mediterranean states. It was primarily France that pushed for a European Union policy that called for both extending the political-economic initiatives of the EU to the Mediterranean and Maghreb states, as well as intensifying such existing initiatives. It was argued that the pressure to migrate from these countries to Europe should be reduced through intensified economic co-operation. This became an argument that the Maghreb governments took on themselves in negotiations. The European Union actually increased its financial aid to the countries in the Mediterranean between 1995 and 1999 to 4.7 billion Euro (Collinson and Edye: 1996, 83). Regarding the Maghreb states, however, this development aid effort was made useless through the negotiated free-trade regulations between them and the EU. These regulations, which are components of the agreement between the Maghreb states and the EU, refer to the liberalization of trade with industrial products. For the most part, it was required that the Maghreb states dismantle tariffs on the import of industrial products from the EU. This liberalization of trade is more an adaptation towards the international markets and less an incentive to create new local jobs. Because of this, Moroccan and Tunisian industrial plants are threatened with being forced out of the market by such trade liberalization (Collinson and Edye: 1996, 83).

This example shows that the equation “more money for development aid policy equals less potential immigrants” falls short if all possible political measures are not kept in sight. Development aid policy is part of a complex system

of international economic and security factors; migration, on the other hand, is part of a complex system of networks and control mechanisms to which political actors only have limited access.

## **Conclusion**

The official strategy of a migration-oriented development aid policy which the French government has implemented since the end of the 1990s, may claim a pioneer character in the Western European immigration countries. Currently, it is not yet possible to evaluate the practical results of the *codéveloppement* strategy in a comprehensive manner. However, the French example demonstrates the very controversial discussion that this policy provokes by aiming at combining financial support for development in the immigrants' countries of origin with the control of further immigration. It is doubtful whether it will be possible to create an internal consensus regarding such a policy in the Western European states. Furthermore – this is an important argument in this paper – migration systems prove to be very complex and deeply rooted in the local structures of immigrants' societies of origin; these are connected more and more with highly ramified transnational relations. The French government has undertaken a determined attempt to react in an adequate manner to the complexity of immigration. However, the causes for migration will not be extinguished merely by raising the standards of living in the countries of origin.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> With her article *Migration Return Policies and Countries of Origin* (1997), Rosemarie Rogers has provided a detailed, informative and critical analysis of these repatriation programmes for migrant workers in the Western European recruiting states.
- <sup>2</sup> See:  
<http://bok.net/pajol/concerne/codev/nair-rapport.html>;  
downloaded on 24.10.2001.
- <sup>3</sup> Le Ministre de l'Intérieur à Mesdames et Messieurs les Préfets; see <http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/bomi/bomi/4trim98/etrangers/k980255.html>; downloaded on 12.03.02.
- <sup>4</sup> Déclaration Commune Franco-Sénégalaise sur le Co-Développement Liée à la Maîtrise des Flux Migratoires. See <http://www.france.diplomatie.fr/actual/dossiers/senegal.html>; downloaded on 26.10.01.
- <sup>5</sup> See [www.europarl.eu.int/conferences/euromed/pdf/manifeste\\_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.eu.int/conferences/euromed/pdf/manifeste_en.pdf). Downloaded on 15.03.02

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